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Proliferation in Cybersecurity

posted Jul 23, 2017, 5:09 PM by James Caroland

By Trey Herr

The WannaCry ransomware, and more recent notPetya wiper, are the latest but certainly not the only examples of proliferation when it comes to malicious software. What is this proliferation? Basically – someone writes a piece of malware, a third party finds it, adapts it, adds in some of their own code …et voila, a new piece of malware is born. This latest epidemic is based on a commonly used ransomware, combined with a modified version of the NSA’s leaked exploit, and tied together with some new encryption functionality and part of an open source security tool.1 

Proliferation deals with the diffusion of capabilities, often new weapons technologies, between different actors in the international political system. In cybersecurity, this proliferation describes how groups learn from and reuse tools developed by others, whether intentionally as through collaboration, or unintentionally. Unintentional proliferation is the process whereby the target of a piece of malicious software takes it apart to learn and reuse it. This unintentional proliferation is an issue not unique to cybersecurity but vastly more prominent than in traditional domains of conflict. 

Malware
Within cybersecurity, intentional proliferation of malware involves direct intelligence support and transfer of software from one party to another. States have no monopoly on capabilities here. Non-state groups are a constant source of innovation on both offense and defense. Proliferation of malware can include a range of different types of information: from highly valuable software vulnerabilities to complete malicious software programs and the supporting infrastructure to covertly deploy them. The skills and capacity of groups on the receiving end of this proliferation can vary dramatically.2 

If code can move across borders with little more than an email, what does counter-proliferation look like for cybersecurity? Because there are no special weapons materials, like plutonium, necessary to create malware, the challenge becomes how to impose costs on attackers. One answer stems from how many kinds of malware are built. Rather than a weapon like a brick, which can be thrown against nearly any object, most malware depends on a software vulnerability. These vulnerabilities are small flaws in software which an attacker, or curious researcher, could take advantage of to manipulate the target computer. 

By reducing the supply of these software vulnerabilities, defenders can raise attacker’s cost to develop and use malicious software. To achieve this, governments should reduce the number and significance of software vulnerabilities (on which malware often depends) by encouraging more effective vulnerability discovery, disclosure, and patching by private companies and researchers. In a new paper, I suggest ten things the policy community in the United States can do to reduce the supply of vulnerabilities and help disrupt the activity of attackers.3  The goal with any of these policy recommendations isn’t to ‘solve’ a problem – security is not something in need of a solution but rather gradual process improvements. Proliferation in cybersecurity is a low cost activity for attackers right now but policymakers can do more to change that. 
-----------------

1For more on the recent notPetya wiper, see: https://lawfareblog.com/ransomware-remixed-song-remains-same
2Portions of this article will appear as a chapter in the upcoming Springer volume, “Cyber Weaponry: Issues and Implications of Digital Arms”
3For more on this, see: Countering the Proliferation of Malware: Targeting the Vulnerability Life Cycle - http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/CounteringProliferationofMalware.pdf



About the Author

Trey Herr

Trey Herr, Ph.D, is a postdoctoral fellow with the Belfer Center's Cyber Security Project at the Harvard Kennedy School. His work focuses on trends in state developed malicious software, the structure of criminal markets for malware components, and the proliferation of malware. Trey is co-editor of Cyber Insecurity — Navigating the Perils of the Next Information Age, an edited volume on cybersecurity policy, and is a non-resident fellow with New America's Cybersecurity Initiative. He previously worked with the Department of Defense to develop a risk assessment methodology for information security threats. He holds a Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science from George Washington University and a B.S. in Theatre and Political Science from Northwestern University.




Photo credit:  "Malware" from infosecinstitute.com

Cyber Making Waves: The Need for Maritime Cyber Security Frameworks

posted Jul 23, 2017, 4:41 PM by James Caroland   [ updated Jul 23, 2017, 4:46 PM ]

By Ian W. Gray    

90% of the world’s goods are shipped via the oceans on over 51,000 merchant ships belonging to multiple different countries.  For the last several years, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialized agency of the United Nation concerned with the safety and security of international shipping, has been discussing the possible implications of cyber-attacks to global commerce. This has been prompted by multiple developments within the Maritime Industry. As ships, port terminals and businesses become more interconnected, they also risk becoming more vulnerable to cyber intrusions and possible attacks.  However, the maritime industry has not had a significant cyber incident that could help quantify the possible losses, until recently. 

In June 2016, the IMO published Interim Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management (MSC.1/Circ.1526) with the intent to provide a risk management framework and prevent large-scale cyber-attacks that could potentially endanger lives, affect the availability of network based shipping systems, or stall global trade.  These threats manifested themselves on June 27, 2017 when A.P. Moller-Maersk was affected by a strain of ransomware dubbed “Petya.”

Petya Ransomware
The Petya ransomware exploited the same Microsoft Windows vulnerability (Eternal Blue) from the WannaCry ransomware strain that infected thousands of computers in May 2017.  That ransomware spread through a patched vulnerability that was unavailable for unsupported versions of Windows.  The attack was likely not targeted towards Maersk, spreading throughout organizations with operating systems that are beyond their lifecycle. 

The ransomware spread through a file-sharing bug that affected organizations around the world, encrypting hard drives and halting critical business operations.  Petya had a similar effect on the Danish shipping company, forcing them to shut down systems to contain the attack.  Though Maersk’s ships were able to safely maneuver, Maersk’s APM Terminal units, which serve 76 port and terminal facilities in 59 countries, were unable to load or unload cargo in select sites around the globe.  Several major ports were impacted, including the Port of Los Angeles, Port Elizabeth in New Jersey, the Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust near Mumbai, affecting their ability to clear cargo.    

Port Terminal

The attack came just days after the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) 98 meeting in June 2017 where a paper (MSC 98/5/2) proposed making cyber risk management onboard ships as mandatory, where previous International Union of Marine Insurance made these requirements voluntary.  The guidelines for these risk assessments were developed by shipowner association and classification societies such as Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), Intertanko, Intercargo and Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA).  These organizations exist to maintain standards throughout the maritime industry, among international stakeholders and governmental organs like the IMO. 

The cyber risk management proposal arrives as the shipping industry is leaning heavily towards digitization and automation.  In May 2017, Maersk published a statement announcing that they were partnering with IBM to digitize their administrative processes and transactions with blockchain technology.  The blockchain will help track shipments around the world through a universal ledger and transition to a paperless system that will keep a reliable and secure record of shipping transactions. 

Other partnerships with companies like Microsoft similarly promise to streamline supply-chain management and lower operational costs through data science.  Additionally, several shipping companies are beginning to test autonomous operations onboard ships to increase safety and efficiency.  Such autonomous systems would likely include cargo handling and navigation, while the drive to lower operational costs could possibly automate the entire shipping process         

Shipping Containers

While the industry is developing in a direction that will likely increase efficiency and decrease costs, the necessary safeguards to protect these automated systems is not fully realized.  The Petya ransomware illustrated the potential effect of a cyber-attack on a major shipping company and port terminals.  The attack could have been far more severe, affecting navigation or engineering systems on merchant ships with possible threat to human life or the environment. 

If ship owners begin to take accountability for cyber security, the industry is likely to progress towards a less vulnerable state. The cost and initiatives to harden their digital infrastructure will take a considerable amount of time and resources. These actions will require, at the least, significant threat modeling to include additional measures like penetration testing, table-top exercises, and periodic audits.  The progressive move towards an automated and digitized shipping infrastructure increases the urgency of these corrective actions, as existing vulnerabilities could be exploited by attackers for financial gain or strategic objectives 

The proposal (MSC 98/5/2) for the MSC 98 advocated for ships to identify cyber risks and implement safeguards.  Additional recommendations from MSC.428(98) recommended that cyber safeguards take effect under the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, with a deadline of 1 January 2021.  Owners risk having their ships detained if they fail to meet the ISM standards for cyber risk.  However, the potential for a cyber-attack on these ships could also prevent them from safely pulling into port. 

Navigation System

While there have been previous incidents of cyber-attacks on merchant shipping, whether targeted or proof-of-concept, the Petya ransomware illustrates the potential large effect of a piece of ransomware. The 1 January 2021 date is a practical deadline for ship owners to implement cyber risk management frameworks; however, it is currently unclear if existing cyber practices can meet the rapid pace of new technology onboard ships.  The shipping industry will have an upstream battle to implement safeguards and identify methods to assess vulnerabilities.  The consequences of failure to meet these standards could affect not only the ship owner, but global commerce.  

Nearly a week after the initial attack, Maersk resumed normal port operations.  The shipping company has not yet assessed the financial damage of the cyber incident, though it significantly affected its ability to load and unload cargo.  Multiple bookings had to be cancelled, and Maersk needs to deal with settlements and liability issues with individual shippers. However the cyber incident is quantified, ultimately the effects were felt throughout the world. This attack has created a sense of urgency to implement new controls, and hopefully they can be met before the 2021 deadline. 


About the Author

Ian W. Gray


Ian W. Gray is a senior intelligence analyst at Flashpoint, where he focuses on producing strategic and business risk intelligence reports on emerging cybercrime.  Ian is also a military reservist with extensive knowledge of the maritime domain and regional expertise of the Middle East, Europe, and South America.







Disclaimer:  Any views expressed within this report are solely the author's and not reflective of nor endorsed by any organization with which he is affiliated.

Photo credits:  All photos within article from Wikipedia Commons


Knockout by Cyber Strike – Fighting Like It’s 1989

posted Jul 1, 2017, 8:03 PM by Clara Bayne   [ updated Jul 3, 2017, 6:07 PM by James Caroland ]

By John Dobrydney


The “Pearl Harbor” metaphor for a successful cyber strike against the United States is an apt one and provides a vehicle for the discussion of initial post-strike reactions and actions, and for suggested policy improvements aimed at deterring crippling attacks. Cyber attacks capable of exploiting critical vulnerabilities, such as the United States government’s and commercial sector’s excessive operational dependence on interconnected computer networks are exceptionally problematic to deter or, if attacked, to determine an appropriate response strategy. Therefore, this paper proposes the following hypothetical: A presumed nation-state launched a cyber strike against the United States, which successfully destroyed its cyber and networking capabilities, thereby rolling back the nation’s ability to wage war as if it were 1989. 


The hypothetical calls for several assumptions. The adversary will attempt a non-attribution attack to obscure the strike initiator and reduce the probability of counterattack. Kinetic or non-kinetic retaliation will be extremely difficult if the United States cannot categorically state who launched the attack and, likewise, other nations will be reluctant to use or condone military force for the same reason. The adversary will also calculate on the attack causing maximum damage and yet still remain beneath the threshold for war. This is, in any event, a challenging response for the United States, as there is no precedent for war in response to a cyber attack.                


The United States will be most vulnerable to physical attack in the immediate chaos and confusion following a cyber strike. Since so much of the United States military’s advantage is rooted in its highly networked command and control systems, a cyber strike will curtail its ability to conduct highly synchronized, well-planned operations or rely on technically advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Logistics planning and execution will rapidly lose synchronization, and commanders will quickly lose visibility on what resources they have, where they have them, and their material condition. One can assume that information stored in the “cloud” or on servers connected to the Internet will be corrupt until proven otherwise, or will not be available if the strike destroyed the storage point or the means to access it. Rarely is information stored in anything other than digital form, so information recall in support of operations and planning will be limited.           


A paralyzing cyber strike will affect all elements of national power. Diplomatically, the United States will be in a weakened position because it failed to deter the cyber strike, and this position will only be exacerbated if the U.S. cannot attribute the attack or find a way to answer - either in kind or via some other means. International solidarity may waver if there is no convincing cause to rally around.


Exceptionally strong leadership coupled with a messaging campaign signaling resolve and resilience will calm public reaction and focus the American people and the international community on solving the problems at hand. This will be challenging, as the normal modes of broadcast communication largely rely on the Internet. Use of newsprint, radio, town hall meetings, and other creative methods will have to suffice until system administrators restore Internet capabilities. Leaders from government and industry will need to cooperate on a way ahead considering both sectors rely on the same Internet for their critical services. This united front requires communication to and support from the public during the initial chaos, and follow-on Internet restoration and potential retribution against the attackers. 


The United States would be militarily correct to assume that a kinetic attack would most likely follow a crippling cyber strike. Quickly raising defense conditions, possibly even considering a nuclear response if “the sleeping giant” deemed it necessary would signal that it is taking the cyber attack most seriously. Disasters such as Pearl Harbor in 1941 and 9/11 have shown that the American people “won’t abandon any involvement” but will become “drawn in” and will want to see a tangible response.1      


Military power relies heavily on cyber assets to provide it with its informational advantage over a wide range of adversaries and capabilities. Joint Publication 3-13 defines information superiority as “the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting and/or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.”2 David Albert highlights the competitiveness in information gathering: “Information Superiority in military operations is a state that is achieved when competitive advantage is derived from the ability to exploit a superior information position. In military operations this superior information position is, in part, gained from information operations that protect our ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting and/or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.”3 Destruction of the DoD Information Network in a cyber strike means that surface, sub-surface, land, air, and space sensors cannot communicate with each other to provide shared battlespace understanding. This lack of sensor information denies the United States the superior informational position necessary to exploit higher tempo operations or to negate an adversary’s quantitative or even qualitative advantage. In short, an asymmetric cyber attack will level the information playing field by defeating its underlying physical network.     


The economic disaster following such a strike will perhaps be the worst tangible effect, as it will cause a cascading global financial meltdown. Cyber attack targets will most likely include financial networks on Wall Street and institutions in other locations, as they are historically soft targets. They are an easy asymmetric attack that will greatly degrade US strategic strength and will instill fear in the populace via a very tangible plunging Dow Jones, decreasing 401(k) balances, and the pronouncements and reminders of a 24-hour media cycle. At best, the strike would cause a short-term lack of access to financial information, causing a recoverable ‘hiccup’ in the system. At worst, corrupted or lost data will lead to a data integrity problem and long-term financial market chaos. Firms will not know what they own, what they sold, or the value of what they hold on their books. To the extent that they can, investors will naturally sell off their stocks and bonds and subsequently tank the economy as fear and increasing uncertainty set in. Moreover, the dollar will lose value, possibly kicking off a cascading global financial collapse. 


One “benefit” of the Internet’s interconnectedness is that most nation states capable of a significant cyber strike on the United States have a stake in the interconnected global economy. Much like the global meltdown caused by the housing mortgage crash in 2007, the effects of a severe economic attack on the United States will cascade across the world and will, most likely, affect the nation that either launched or supported the cyber attack. However, as history has shown, the market will rebound and the United States’ economic capacity is amazingly resilient. Congressional research following 9/11 showed that “the loss of lives and property on 9/11 was not large enough to have had a measurable effect on the productive capacity of the United States” and that “the overall economic impacts of the 9/11 attacks were even lower than initially estimated, indicating that the United States economy is more resilient in the face of disaster and intentional attack than commonly assumed.”4 It might be the case then that any country capable of launching a successful cyber strike against the United States will not be able to escape the metaphorical blast pattern and will only succeed in harming itself.


Joint Publication 1 both notes that cyberspace resides in the physical domain, and defines it as “a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures including the Internet, telecommunications, networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.”5 The physical domain supports information creation, storage, and transfer and is the physical network upon which the more familiar informational dimension the World Wide Web depends. Cyber is globally interconnected and ubiquitous; it supports the four elements of national power, all military warfighting domains, as well as virtually every global commercial process. Therefore, an attack causing a cyber-service disruption will have a noticeable impact of varying degrees depending on the level of connectedness to the point of attack.

 

At its conception, the Internet’s designers never considered how their creation might evolve to the phenomenon it is today. The small group of academics designed the ARPANET in 1969, in part, to provide an alternate communications path in the event that a nuclear attack disrupted primary communication routes. An ARPANET spinoff produced a rudimentary network that allowed academics to share their findings amongst participating United States universities. Membership was small, and a shared professional ethic disallowed foul play. As such, the system expanded without considering explicit security controls. Over the years, and with a desire to push new technology, the network expanded with the invention of the web browser to provide everyday users with access to the World Wide Web.  Coupled with a virtually free telecommunications infrastructure left over from the dot-com boom and bust, the Internet grew virally throughout most industrialized countries. A “virtuous cycle” arose as faster computing power via the Internet led to more business productivity. In turn, greater productivity led to a desire for faster computing power, and so on.6 Security was a minor concern in the design phase and soon became prohibitively expensive, and inhibited business operations when security managers added vulnerability mitigations as an afterthought.


Securing the Internet is largely a contest of measure and countermeasure. The inherent flaws and vulnerabilities in computer hardware, software, and in the users who operate and administer networks give both the initiative and the easier task to the offense. Any defense must be 100% foolproof, whereas an attacker needs only a single penetration to conduct whatever malicious activity he has planned. The defender requires skills in areas as diverse as preventing physical access to servers and routing hardware; preventing “social engineering” whereby an attacker deceives a user by phone, email, or in person to gain restricted network access; detecting malware injection via phishing scams; applying supply chain risk management, which seeks to secure the end-to-end supply chain; ensuring proper encryption use; ensuring new hardware and software versions do not introduce new vulnerabilities; and implementing cyber security controls  properly so they do not introduce their own new vulnerabilities. Adding to a defender’s problems is the fact that skilled attackers can hide their presence, which causes delay in attribution and response. Given enough time and resources (e.g., state sponsorship, education, and Internet provided information ironically), the offensive has the upper hand.    


Strategic actions and responses following a “Cyber Pearl Harbor” would be similar to the bold and unorthodox responses following the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack. In the aftermath following that attack, the United States found its strategy for countering and destroying Japanese aggression in the Pacific suddenly unfeasible, its means sidelined until repairs and new ships came online, and its confidence severely shaken.7 The attack sidelined the mobile fighting strength in the Pacific, its battleships, until the United States could shift to a wartime economy to reinforce remaining strength and support strategic ends. Fortunately, the remaining perceived American military strength deterred the Japanese from following through with a second strike on Pearl Harbor to destroy oil farms, shipyard facilities, and submarines. This gave the United States time to “catch breath, restore morale, and rebuild forces.”8 Driven by events, submarines and naval aviation took center stage following Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Stark’s order six hours after the Pearl Harbor attack: “Execute unrestricted air and submarine warfare against Japan.”9


The Pearl Harbor attack in 1941 and a Cyber Pearl Harbor attack in present times suggest several strategic parallels. Initial deterrence did not work, but for various reasons, Japan did not press its advantage. This point leads to another.  Intelligence in late 1941 lost track of the Japanese carrier divisions and was unable to detect preparations and movements. It is far more foreseeable today that the United States would use its extensive ISR capability and the analytical capabilities within the intelligence community to detect preparations for an attack large enough to follow an initial cyber strike. For an adversary to wait and make preparations following a cyber strike would not only be a race against who can mobilize fast enough for decisive results but would also forfeit the element of surprise one of the advantages afforded by a crippling cyber strike. No one, then or now, can match the United States’ economic might. It would be prudent for an adversary to either launch a non-attributable cyber attack against the United States and then maintain normal operations or continue to cripple the United States with an electromagnetic pulse set off by nuclear weapons as a quick follow-up that needs little preparation time. Otherwise, the United States, as historically shown, will rapidly use overwhelming force.    


The 1941 attack greatly changed the conduct of the Pacific war; likewise, a crippling cyber strike would change the conduct of a potential follow-on war.10 War Plan Orange called for the battle line and supporting ships to steam west in defense of the Philippines and other United States territories in a climactic showdown with the Imperial Japanese Navy. December 7, 1941, obsoleted that line of thinking. Regardless, the new Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet, Admiral Nimitz, a submariner by trade, had to use what he had at hand to defend Hawaii and the west coast of the continental United States, to conserve his fighting force for the long road to Tokyo, and to rebuild the destroyed fleet he inherited. Forced to center stage by events, the unscathed submarine force and naval aviation assumed starring roles in an initial strategic defense and later, an offense of the Pacific. In today’s context, a cyber strike will force Joint Force Commanders to use what they have at hand and will need the flexibility required to either revise or develop a new strategy that does not initially rely on information superiority until the United States can restore its networks and cyber capabilities. The technology, United States workforce, and economic potential would still exist, so it will be possible to rebuild the networks and capabilities over time. Small intranets firewalled from or not connected to the Internet during the cyber strike could still operate and provide rudimentary services and access to the network’s information. In the interim, strategists may determine that the Internet and the current command and control model has been more of a hindrance to effective operations and by necessity in extremis may find another way to solve the problem, similar to aviation and submarines displacing battleships. For example, there has been much discussion on dispersion and swarming tactics that rely on decentralized decision making with only a generalized higher headquarters intent. Perhaps with today’s advances in HF/VHF/UHF radio technology, units can adopt such methodology and still retain agility and flexibility, while higher headquarters make do with far less information and decision-making authority. 


Given the United States’ excessive operational dependence on its networks, a strategy to both deter a crippling cyber strike against the United States and to maintain a minimum level of operational capability, should such an attack occur, is called for. Deterrence must be real and tangible, and thought of as a “…psychological relationship; the goal is to shape an opponent’s perceptions, expectations, and ultimately its decisions about launching an attack. Thus, deterrence requires an ‘opponent’ who is thinking, or might readily think of attacking. Ideally deterrence short-circuits that thinking…making it a deliberately contrived relationship with an opponent.”11 Further, “deterrence is not only used to prevent attacks and war via threats of harm. It is often used via attacks and war, that is, deterrence by doing harm.”12


International informational and diplomatic signals that state that nations who engage in certain levels of cyber attacks will suffer tangible repercussions can be a powerful deterrent. Nuclear deterrence during the Cold War provides a precedent. Nations that used nuclear weapons could expect a nuclear response per the Mutual Assured Destruction policy. Capabilities assigned the mission of responding to a cyber strike must remain untouchable from the cyber domain, else the deterrent effect is lost and those forces be susceptible to the same cyber threats as any other network user. 


The remaining problem is attribution. While greater emphasis and capabilities are required to determine an attack’s point of origin, the United States should make it clear that the time delay common in determining attribution will not have an attached statute of limitations. Deterring a crippling nation-state cyber strike depends on adversaries absolutely knowing that a coalition of wide ranging resources will identify them, and that overwhelming harm will soon follow.


In case deterrence fails to stop a cyber strike, the United States must have a strategy of decentralization, resilience, and rapid healing. A good form of defense is to make the offense’s capabilities irrelevant. In the case of the Internet in its current form, it will always have exploitable vulnerabilities; therefore, networks will always be under varying levels of attack whether by state employed experienced hackers, amateur “script kiddies,” or something in between. The goal should be to stay a few steps ahead of the attackers and maintain a level of survivability such that the command and control structure can still function, albeit in a restricted fashion. Decentralized network control is an effective method to rapidly respond to network attacks and prevent such attacks from propagating through the network. Users must know the role they need to play: “Disaster researchers have shown that victims are often themselves the first responders and that centralized, hierarchical, bureaucratic responses can hamper their ability to respond in the decentralized, self-organized manner that has often proved to be more effective.”13       


Resilience and rapid healing apply not only to the physical network itself but also to the infrastructure, agencies, and processes operating the network.14 One characteristic of a well-designed communications network is that operators can expect a certain percentage of degradation and faults, and overall network operation will not suffer. If the primary route fails, then alternate routes are available during the time it takes to repair the primary. Well-designed networks require planning, constant attention to network operations, and well thought out policy that takes network failures into account. Failure recovery becomes a part of normal operations. Likewise, users who depend on communications networks for their operations must develop their own means of resiliency in case of network degradation, or even destruction following a cyber strike. Recalling the lessons of Pearl Harbor, resilience calls for an open mind, broad experience, and a willingness to innovate and take risks on unorthodox concepts. Designing a more resilient stock market, banking infrastructure, news media, government, and logistics organization that can operate on degraded or lack of Internet access will mitigate the effects of a potentially crippling cyber strike, and will ensure that organizations and users are better able to operate in a degraded environment. These social networks must have the same rapid healing characteristics as the physical network and must be part of normal operations. Increased resiliency in not only the physical network but also in the social networks, coupled with decentralized authority to take appropriate action with minimal communications capabilities, will reduce United States networking critical vulnerabilities, complement primary cyber deterrence means, and enable the United States to continue to execute its national security strategy with today’s capabilities.15

 


About the Author

A Marine Communications Officer, Lieutenant Colonel John Dobrydney is an experienced cybersecurity and network operations planner. He recently served as the Commanding Officer of Marine Wing Communications Squadron – 18, the Executive Officer of 7th Communication Battalion, the Network Operations Officer for the III MEF G6, and served as the Enterprise Information Assurance Branch Head at Headquarters, Marine Corps C4 Directorate. He currently serves as the Cybersecurity Division Chief, Joint Staff J6. Lieutenant Colonel Dobrydney has a Masters of Security Studies from the Marine Corps War College and a Master of Science in IT Management from the Naval Postgraduate School.

 

 

End Notes

1. Sean Lawson, “Beyond Cyber-Doom: Cyberattack Scenarios and the Evidence of History,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2011, http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/beyond-cyber-doom-cyber-attack-scenarios-evidence-history_1.pdf.

2. Alberts, David S, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare, (Washington, DC: CCRP Press, 2003), 54.

3. Sean Lawson, “Beyond Cyber-Doom: Cyberattack Scenarios and the Evidence of History,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2011, http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/beyond-cyber-doom-cyber-attack-scenarios-evidence-history_1.pdf.

4. Alberts, David S, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare, (Washington, DC: CCRP Press, 2003), 54.

5. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, Washington, DC: DOD, 2009. P. I-7.

6. Carey, Davis and John E. Morris, King of Capital, (New York: Crown Business, 2012), 149.

7. Gordon Prange, At Dawn We Slept, (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 582.

8. Ibid.

9. United States, ed., How We Fight: Handbook for the Naval Warfighter (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2015).

10. Alan D. Zimm, Attack on Pearl Harbor, (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2011), 385.

11. National Research Council (U.S.) et al., Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyberattacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2010), http://site.ebrary.com/id/10425159.

12. Ibid.

13. Sean Lawson, “Beyond Cyber-Doom: Cyberattack Scenarios and the Evidence of History,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2011, http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/beyond-cyber-doom-cyber-attack-scenarios-evidence-history_1.pdf.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.


Photo credits (in order of appearance):  salon.com, TELEGRID, forbes.com, TruthHugger.com, History of Domain Names, navy.com, linkedin.com, LinkedIn

Developing a Strategy for Cyber Conflict

posted Jun 22, 2017, 12:48 AM by Clara Bayne   [ updated Jul 3, 2017, 6:06 PM by James Caroland ]

By Arnold J. Abraham, Institute for Defense Analyses


Introduction

History teaches the importance of developing the right strategy to adapt to a changing situation on the world stage. At the dawn of the last century, a significant shift in the global balance of power began to emerge. Germany’s power was rising, but it still faced significant rivals on both her Eastern and Western borders. The Schlieffen Plan was developed as a strategy to meet this challenge and was put to the test in World War I. The strategy called for Germany to leverage its military and infrastructure strengths to rapidly mobilize and concentrate forces to quickly defeat the French army on one front before shifting east to face the Russians. The strategy failed and the results were catastrophic. Almost ten million soldiers died in that war, far exceeding any conflict to date, and the unresolved struggle soon led to another war, which was even more devastating.


Now, in the early 21st century, the United States is the sole global superpower, but new concerns require non-linear extrapolation to develop a strategy to overcome current and future adversaries. In particular, the emergence of the cyberspace domain presents unprecedented opportunities and challenges for national security. Nations around the world have begun to recognize the significance of this dynamic, but the United States has the most at stake due to its premier position. With this in mind, U.S. Cyber Command is in the process of training and deploying a cyber force. But to optimize that force, the right strategy is needed.


This paper explores the question, “How do we develop the right force optimization strategy for cyber conflict?” It is important to invest time and effort to work through the concepts because the stakes are enormous. The first issue to address is the significance of conflict in cyberspace, not just as an aspect in the evolution of modern warfare, but as an integral element of today’s society and world. Within this context, optimal approaches for conducting cyber warfare are explored, including the best ways to posture and utilize the cyber force. Ultimately, a risk management approach is proposed to allow for leverage against many unknown factors. In the absence of hard-earned lessons learned through full-scale conflicts, simulation, exercises, and war games become the vital ingredients for developing successful strategies. But these tools can only go so far—the objective strategy may require a significant restructuring and rebalancing effort. The scale of the change seems daunting, but as cyber conflict transcends military conflict, the change should be dealt with in a revolutionary manner that does not underestimate the growing importance of cyberspace in global affairs. 

What is Strategy? 

Why bother to discuss strategy after the April 2015 publishing of the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy to guide the development of DoD’s cyber forces and strengthen its cyber defense and cyber deterrence posture? That document did an excellent job of describing the drivers behind the need for a strategy and articulated a set of five strategic goals and over a dozen detailed objectives. However, it is better characterized as a “strategic implementation plan” rather than a strategy itself. It is a good roadmap, but one based on the assumption of a known objective end state. Alternatively, this paper calls for an examination of underlying premises because even the best map cannot be used to chart a path if one is not yet sure of the ultimate destination or method of travel.

Developing a Strategy is the art of balancing Ends, Ways, and Means against Risks. Ends are the objectives (what is to be achieved), Ways are the courses of action or methods (how and when are the available tools used to get the job done), and Means are the resources (what tools are to be acquired and used). Assessing Risk involves recognizing the Strengths and Weaknesses and the Opportunities and Threats presented by the environment and the actors. Unfortunately, U.S. leaders sometimes overlook the importance of using this model to develop optimal strategies. Instead, over-reliance on superior technology and greater resources is seen as the path to victory. When it comes to Cyber Strategy, these advantages are no longer determinative, and thus pressure is building for a more astute approach.

What is the significance of cyber conflict in modern warfare and society?

For much of human history, nations fought over control of territory. Fertile land, rich mineral deposits, navigable rivers, and safe harbors were the early prizes that eventually evolved into vital industrial and population centers. Land and sea forces were the predominant means to seize and maintain these objectives. As technology advanced, control of the airspace became an important contributor to determining the outcome of battle. Similarly, the automation of command and control mechanisms added the potential for actions in the cyberspace domain to affect conflicts between air, land, sea, and space forces. But cyber power now also offers a potential approach to conflict independent of military engagement in the traditional air, land, maritime, and space domains.

Where will the most significant struggles play out for dominance in the cyberspace domain?

Virtually all modern battlefield weapon systems have some connection to cyberspace. This means existing arsenals of air, land, and naval weapons themselves represent potential direct targets in cyber conflict at the tactical level. Similarly, administrative, logistical, and other support networks essential to conducting military operations are reliant on cyberspace and therefore are potentially vulnerable to cyber attacks as part of theater-wide campaigns. Finally, critical civilian national infrastructures that provide the foundations for military force projection now also have cyber vulnerabilities that can be exploited at the strategic level. Thus, cyberspace operations must take place at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of conflict.

The ability for cyber power to be applied across all levels of war has led several strategists to consider the development of airpower as an analogy. Aircraft offer a similar range of options, starting with air-to-air or air-to-ground engagements (e.g., dogfights, tank plinking), moving up to targeting military installations (e.g., airfields, logistics depots), and finally to directly disrupting strategic infrastructures (e.g., petroleum-oil-lubricants and ball bearing plants). As airpower developed, significant debate ensued as to where along this spectrum it would be most effective. Even after more than 100 years of using airpower, the debate continues. A similar debate has begun on the application of cyber power. However, instead of expecting a definitive answer, the lesson to be applied from the airpower analogy is that we must be prepared to use cyber power across each level of war from the tactical to strategic.

The cyberspace domain is more than the newest realm for extending traditional military conflict to achieve military ends. The pervasive nature of cyberspace in modern society has led to challenges beyond those that typically fall within the purview of a military force. First, the age-old struggle between the concepts of freedom of information/transparency versus personal privacy has been amplified significantly through the emergence of cyberspace. Second, the entire global economy is increasingly intermeshed with cyberspace, and the competition for information advantage has become an essential ingredient of private sector profitability. The cyberspace domain has become an integral part of modernity. Given this unique dynamic, the airpower analogy falls short when trying to extend lessons beyond the military dimension. Instead, we must look to other models.

Deterrence and Cyber Conflict 

The theory of deterrence, which is as old as war itself, has been applied with varying degrees of success to avoid conflict entirely or discourage use of particular weapons and attack techniques. During the Cold War, much thought went into nuclear deterrence theory in an attempt to grapple with the extreme consequences of atomic weapons. The “Wizards of Armageddon” developed concepts such as the strategic triad, massive retaliation, and mutually assured destruction, which became part of national strategy.

The potential to apply deterrence to cyber conflict has garnered interest, and “deterrence of cyberattacks” is discussed in the DoD Cyber Strategy. However, much work remains to be done, starting with determining what goal is really being sought. Is this a version of “cyber arms control” or “de-escalation?” Or does the United States seek to retain freedom of action to use cyber power as it deems necessary while restricting any potential adversary’s range of options? Answering these questions requires first figuring out our strategic concept for the use of cyber power.

Additionally, deterrence requires predictable actors whose decisions can be influenced through the right combination of words and deeds targeted to affect their interests. This is particularly challenging for future cyber conflict, which may include unpredictable and radical non-state actors, some of which remain unidentified, while others may not yet exist. Thus, discussion of cyber deterrence should be pursued within the context of developing an overarching strategy for cyber conflict – the optimal mix of “ends,” “ways,” and “means.”

What will the primary nature of future cyberspace struggles involve? What are the “Ends” we should strive to achieve?

Military. As noted above, conflict in cyberspace can have multiple dimensions. First, there is the application of cyber operations as a component of military power to enable, supplement, or replace use of other capabilities. This can be done through either force-on-force attacks or by directly attacking other military targets. As cyber weapons mature and proliferate, these types of attacks will likely become a standard part of military conflicts. Providing information assurance for conventional weapon platforms will be as vital as providing an air defense umbrella for land and sea forces and rear areas. The ability to disrupt an adversary’s weapon platforms through cyber-attack will also be a valuable tool, but possibly less vital in most cases due to the availability of existing kinetic options to service the same potential targets. Cyber-attack options will be most valuable when political considerations constrain the use of traditional military force. Although the application of cyber power can lead to casualties and physical destruction, there is also the potential to launch attacks whose effects are intentionally limited to being non-kinetic, temporary, reversible, or all three, and that may be more suitable for the early stages of an international crisis. On the other end of the scale, military cyber-attacks may provide the only feasible means to penetrate hard targets without paying too high a price in terms of friendly force attrition against heightened physical defenses. However, to date, no direct cyber casualties have been recorded.

Intelligence/Counterintelligence. While cyber power will grow to be a significant complement to kinetic force application during military conflict, it will have even greater roles in other areas as evidenced by recent events. Cyber capabilities have already radically altered the landscape for intelligence and counterintelligence. The amount of digitized information far exceeds what has previously been available, and the center of gravity for the intelligence world has already shifted to the cyberspace domain. If a nation wishes to keep its secrets, it must first provide adequate security for its networks. A single insider with wide network access can wreak havoc, as has been demonstrated on more than one occasion (e.g., Snowden, Manning). On the other end of the spectrum, a determined power can develop remote accesses that lead to transfers of valuable information on an unprecedented scale. In 2012, General Keith Alexander, Director of the National Security Agency and Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, described the loss of industrial information and intellectual property through cyber espionage as the “greatest transfer of wealth in history.” Thus, conventional weapon platforms may still dominate current and future military conflicts, but the tide has already turned in the world of espionage and the role of cyber power within it.

Homeland Security. Homeland security is another area of which cyber power has become a crucial component. Critical civilian infrastructures in sectors such as power, transportation, banking, and communications increasingly rely on cyberspace components. The increased efficiency of the advances has benefited society, but it comes with a price that has not yet been fully realized. A whole new class of vulnerabilities exists, which requires attention beyond the physical protective measures we have traditionally relied on to remain secure. Further, unlike in the physical world, the potential to exploit those vulnerabilities is not limited to those actors in close proximity to the facilities. This is a particularly irksome challenge for the United States to face after having enjoyed the buffer of its oceans for two centuries. Hostile actors from anywhere across the planet now represent a direct potential threat. Such actors may have no affiliation with foreign militaries or intelligence services. They may not even be part of any recognized terrorist organization and could remain “under the radar” from the perspective of traditional geopolitical security interests.


Law Enforcement. On a day-to-day basis, law enforcement is the one area that has been affected by the cyberspace domain even more notably than espionage or homeland security. The vast majority of cybersecurity incidents are not traced back to foreign military forces, intelligence agents, or terrorists—they are simple criminal acts, often committed by low-level perpetrators, including some who may not even have malign intentions. Hackers are everywhere today, ranging from the teenage lone-wolf script kiddies in competition for bragging rights to international criminal syndicates organizing multimillion-dollar embezzlement schemes. This ubiquitous challenge is complicated by the fact that the technical signatures of malicious cyber activity are often hard to distinguish when first detected (if they are detected at all). This means that activity appearing to be a criminal breach may ultimately be traced to state-sponsored action with political or military motives. While national security concerns continue to grow, the predominant cyber threat to guard against today remains criminal activity, which now costs the global economy over $400 billion per year.

Regulation. The final area for consideration is the most mundane and most removed from the high-adrenalin crisis-oriented world of military conflict. In fact, the greatest risks and destructive impacts within the cyberspace domain to date have been crises that neither the military nor homeland security or law enforcement forces could prevent. Instead, the greatest damage has been due to inadvertent technical failures, which are more akin to acts of nature and natural disasters than acts of a determined adversary. These threats are best addressed by regulation and safety measures. The most prominent example was the self-inflicted wound of “Y2K” and subsequent remediation, which cost over $300 billion worldwide. Industry generally riles against government regulation of cyberspace, but as the risks to public safety grow, the role of regulation and oversight will inevitably increase. Cybersecurity managers will eventually find solace in regulations that help to define standards of due care considered by the courts to determine liability with some predictability. The traffic safety model offers an analogy of where things may be headed in cyberspace. Before the automobile, anyone with the physical ability and resources could ride a horse with little interference from the government. As the automobile became prevalent, an entire regulatory scheme and supporting infrastructure evolved to ensure safe transit (speed limits, traffic lights, highway guard-rails, vehicle registration, license plates, driver’s licenses, mandatory insurance, etc.). Unfettered access by any and all to the “information super-highway” may soon become a risk society can no longer afford. How to manage that risk through optimal regulatory means and enforcement mechanisms may be the most daunting cyberspace challenge faced by the government.

What are the optimal organizational approaches (i.e., the “Means”) to help achieve and maintain dominance in cyberspace?

While some conflicts between nations consist primarily of military contests, it is clear that the struggle for dominance in cyberspace involves multiple axes of effort as noted above. Given the widely varied nature of the threats faced in the cyberspace domain, the question of how to best posture our capabilities becomes crucial. Defending the network on one day may mean blocking hostile attempts to overload a system with denial of service traffic, but on the next day, it could require enforcing maintenance of a firewall standard on a private company’s server. It could involve discovering and countering malware implanted in critical platforms, or strikes against the source of such attacks to cut off their command and control. Cyber threats continue to evolve and escalate at a pace beyond what we are used to in the physical domain. The struggle for dominance in cyberspace will require a versatile force that can operate within and across the variety of challenges found in the military, homeland security, intelligence, law enforcement, and regulatory realms.

Can existing structures be adapted to meet the new challenges? Currently, the bulk of the U.S. Government’s cyber resources reside within the Department of Defense (DoD), including the National Security Agency, U.S. Cyber Command and Cyber Command’s Service Components. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) also have key roles. However, none of these elements have the complete range of authorities and capabilities to deal with the full scope of the challenge. The Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, Admiral Mike Rogers, recognized this reality when he described cyber as “the ultimate team sport” because no one organization has all the answers or the capability to solve all problems.
 

Bolstering any one of the existing elements, a combination of them, or even all of them will still fail to address the seams and inherent frictions of interagency bureaucracy. But there is no need to accept the status quo and rely on virtual “pick-up” teams drawn from across a sprawling network of independent agencies. Instead of trying to wedge cyberspace into the existing apparatus, a new model should be explored. Cyberspace presents many new and unique challenges, but this is not the first time that the nation has had to struggle with problems that do not present themselves neatly within current frameworks. Organizations such as the United States Coast Guard, the Merchant Marine, and the Public Health Service provide useful models that could be templates for building a cyber force to address all of the nation’s concerns. Those organizations were formed to fill crucial gaps that once existed, and they continue to provide unique services today.

The Coast Guard is a uniformed, armed military service that resides within the Department of Homeland Security during times of peace, but can operate under the Department of Defense when war is declared, or by direction of the President. Its missions fall within the categories of maritime safety, security, and stewardship. The Coast Guard is the pre-eminent law enforcement authority within its domain. In addition to securing waterways against intrusion by unauthorized personnel or materials, the Coast Guard develops and enforces vessel construction standards and domestic shipping and navigation regulations. To ensure compliance, it reviews and approves plans for ship construction, repair, and alteration, and it routinely inspects vessels, mobile offshore drilling units, and marine facilities for safety. Finally, the Coast Guard provides aids to navigation and search and rescue services that are welcome by all legitimate mariners. Unlike any other military force, the Coast Guard has a pervasive domestic presence, interacting in an authoritative manner on a day-to-day basis with civilians operating in their domain. The public not only accepts the Coast Guard’s role, but generally embraces and depends on it as a valued partner in maritime pursuits. The cyber force of the future should have a similar ability to transition smoothly from regulatory, to law enforcement, to security functions, adapting to different challenges as they present themselves. Strong relationships with the private sector are likewise essential, because the primary domain for conflict is not a remote battlefield across the globe, but the server farms and databases of companies forming the backbone of the new digital economy. A future “U.S. Cyber Guard” (or an independent “Cyber Agency” or a new cabinet-level “Cyber Department”) could be postured to directly repel attacks on critical infrastructures, aid the private sector and government in remediation efforts or resiliency measures, and help set and enforce day-to-day standards in cybersecurity for issues that impact the nation’s security. The Coast Guard model deserves careful study because, despite the pressing need, the public is not inclined to endorse DoD or the Intelligence Community with the broad responsibilities needed for true effectiveness in cyberspace. Thus, a new organization outside of those elements is needed at the Agency or Department level—independent, yet interdependent. Regardless of what it is called, the new organization must have mixed authorities and responsibilities for cyberspace in a manner similar to those the Coast Guard has in the maritime domain.

Two other important organizations that offer lessons learned are the Merchant Marine and the U.S. Public Health Service. These organizations are relatively minor components of the Federal Government today, but they have rich histories going back to the early days of the United States. They were established outside of the predominant organizations to perform vital niche functions that contribute to national and homeland security. On one end of the spectrum, the U.S. Public Health Service is a small cadre of experienced medical personnel who are commissioned as officers and distributed to serve across numerous federal organizations. Taking the opposite approach, today’s federal component of the Merchant Marine exists only in the form of a training academy that teaches new mariners, who can then work as civilians manning vessels. Following one of these models, a “U.S. Cyber Academy” could be established to train the finest network security engineers, who would then fulfill their federal obligations by serving in key cybersecurity positions for the private sector. In the other model, a “U.S. Cyber Hygiene Service” could be created to manage a cadre of operations experts who would be assigned to work within each federal department to fill key cybersecurity roles.




Merchant Marine – a Model for Integrated Government and Private Sector Cyber Partners

The United States Merchant Marine is a fleet of over 400 U.S.-registered, privately owned civilian merchant vessels that carries imports and exports during peacetime, and that can become a naval auxiliary during wartime to deliver troops and war materiel. The Merchant Marine is complemented by the National Defense Reserve Fleet, which consists of “mothballed” ships that can be activated during national emergencies, either military or non-military, such as commercial shipping crises.

Merchant mariners move cargo and passengers between nations and within the United States, and they operate deep-sea merchant ships, tugboats, towboats, ferries, dredges, excursion vessels, charter boats, and other waterborne craft on the oceans, the Great Lakes, rivers, canals, harbors, and other waterways.

During World War II, the U.S. Government controlled the cargo and the destinations, contracted with private companies to operate the ships, put guns and armed Navy personnel on board. The U.S. Maritime Service trained the men to operate the ships and assist in manning the guns. Over 240,000 served, and they suffered one of the highest casualty rates of any Service in the war. Today, the uniformed Merchant Maritime Service exists only at the U. S. Merchant Marine Academy, a federal service academy that educates licensed Merchant Marine officers who serve U.S. marine transportation and defense needs in peacetime and war. Graduates are obligated to serve aboard vessels or be commissioned as officers in the military or National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Corps.

A cyber equivalent of the Merchant Marine could involve a range of options. To mirror its current form, a U.S. Cyber Academy would provide trained cyber experts who would populate private cybersecurity firms upon graduation, but they would have reserve commissions and be on tap for recall in the event of crises. On the far extreme, significant investments could be made in a dual-purpose cyber infrastructure that would not only aid in commerce but also bolster resiliency and be subject to direct government re-purposing in the event of national need.

U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) – a Template for National Cyber Hygiene?
The USPHS consists of a uniformed commissioned corps of 6,500 public health professionals who serve within federal agencies such as the National Institutes of Health and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The USPHS provides rapid and effective response to public health needs, leadership in public health practices, and advancement of public health science. USPHS traces its beginnings back to the U.S. Marine Hospital Service, which protected against the spread of disease from sailors returning from foreign ports and screened the health of immigrants entering the country. Today, USPHS officers are involved in health care delivery to underserved and vulnerable populations, disease control and prevention, biomedical research, food and drug regulation, mental health and drug abuse services, and response efforts to natural and man-made disasters as an essential component of the largest public health program in the world.

A cyber equivalent of the USPHS would consist of a new uniformed Cyber Service, separate from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. Just as when the Air Force was formed, this does not mean every cyber operator would need to be pulled from his or her current home. Instead, the Cyber Service could be a small cadre that focuses on only advanced offensive or defensive cyber operations—and like current USPHS professionals, they could be embedded within other elements of government to aid those organizations.


None of these examples are sufficient to serve as complete solutions, but they highlight the potential for unconventional approaches. It is clear that cyberspace conflict is not just a military issue. A successful strategy begins with recognizing the scope of the problem, and posturing correctly to address the challenge. Whatever form it would take—U.S. Cyber Guard, U.S. Cyber Service, or U.S. Cyber Academy—it cannot be just another element of DoD. Beyond Title 10 warfighting responsibilities, strong law enforcement, regulatory, and intelligence authorities are also needed. A hybrid element bridging both DoD and DHS, like the Coast Guard, holds the most promise to handle the full range of issues.

What are the best “Ways” to strategically posture and operationally utilize the Cyber Mission Force?      

Once the overarching challenges are addressed, there will still be a need for a military cyber force devoted to military missions. The U.S must first choose whether the cyber force currently under development should become the kernel of a new comprehensive solution or focus solely on the military mission. The former requires significant political advocacy for changes in authorities and organizational structures that are unlikely to materialize without an external catalyst (e.g., a “Cyber Pearl Harbor” or “Cyber 9/11”) to force new thinking. The latter means ceding ground on which most of today’s cyber conflicts and internal controversy resides, but it allows a focus on the military’s traditional spheres of expertise.

A force optimization strategy that confines the Cyber Mission Force to a military focus requires evaluating cyber weapons’ utility as a substitute for or complement to other military capabilities. The key question is whether cyber weapons provide “another arrow in the quiver” or a whole different method of conflict. Do cyber weapons simply provide another means to take out existing priority targets, or do they represent something entirely different—such as the next stage in the evolution of combined arms warfare?

Employing a combination of military techniques to leverage the strengths of particular weapon systems against the weakness of others is a mainstay of modern conflict. This approach, known as “combined arms” (originally conceived to involve infantry, mounted cavalry, and artillery), continues to evolve as technology brings new weapons to the battlefield. Today, military officers are still taught the critical importance of synchronizing attacks through different means to defeat adaptive adversaries.

When applied to airpower, combined arms meant that one could not rely solely on anti-aircraft artillery to defend airspace but also needed the ability to scramble fighters to intercept and engage in air-to-air combat with intruding bombers. In turn, the bombers were given fighter escorts to aid in penetration of enemy defenses.

At sea, a complex network of specialized vessels and aircraft has been developed, including attack submarines, frigates, destroyers, cruisers, and aircraft carriers. No fleet sails without the appropriate combination of these platforms to ensure capability against a range of threats.

Inclusion of cyber attack and defense in combined arms warfare will apply to land, sea, and air combat. Just as ground forces learned to consider their vulnerability to air strikes, all military forces must now become prepared for cyber attacks. Under this construct, future Army Divisions may each require their own cyber battalions, responsible for tactical offensive and defensive cyber maneuvers within their areas of operation. The same would be true of Navy, Air Force, and Marine equivalent forces.


An alternative way to envision cyber forces is as specialized strategic capabilities limited to certain extreme cases, in a manner such as chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. These weapons, judged by society as particularly gruesome means of causing death and destruction, are generally reserved for dire circumstances. In most cases, their use is tightly controlled by treaty, agreement, or public policy. Unlike the combined arms model, which would lead to inclusion of cyberspace engagements in practically any and all conflicts, this method of employment would see offensive cyber power become highly restricted.

While cyber attacks may someday be viewed as similar to attacks by other weapons of mass effect, they do not currently carry such a stigma and are therefore relatively free of internationally recognized restrictions on battlefield employment. However, the fear of potential widespread secondary and cascading effects do bring significant political pressures to bear when using cyber power against civilian targets or other networks connected to the Internet. Therefore, cyber power may best be employed in a hybrid manner. The first method is on a tactical and operational level, in conjunction or integrated with other military forces, in a counter-force role to disrupt or otherwise defeat adversary military weapon systems and forces. The second method is on a strategic level, independently as a counter-value capability to directly affect an adversary’s national power through cyber attacks on civilian and economic centers of gravity.

There is another fundamental question beyond determining how cyber forces best fit in alongside and integrated with other military forces to achieve objectives. Within the cyberspace domain itself, the individualized tactics to achieve optimal effects remain a vital issue. Other weapon systems are limited by geography and many other physical constraints, but these do not apply in cyberspace. For example, there is no need to conserve firepower due to the logistical strains behind storage and transport of available rounds of ammunition. There are also no circles to be drawn on the map to depict the maximum effective range where targets can be held at risk before fuel or gravity holds sway. Additionally, there is no need to apportion the physical terrain as a means to avoid friendly fire and fratricide. Instead, the limiting variables are access to detailed intelligence, maintaining access on extremely dynamic networks, and perishability of exploits once specific attack mechanisms become public or after first use.


Within these new constraints, the most effective means to employ cyber power will likely vary because of the fluid nature of the domain. However, certain techniques may be worth using as the default. For example, a basic question is whether it is more effective to concentrate firepower or distribute it. The “deep and narrow” approach and the “shallow and wide” approach (e.g., precision-guided weapons versus carpet bombing) each has its benefits and detriments in different scenarios.

Similarly, one must consider whether to apply “strength versus strength,” or is it better to use one’s strongest force to exploit weaknesses in an adversary’s defense? Sun Tzu wrestled with these questions 2,500 years ago, and his sage advice stood the test of time in the physical domain, but it may or may not translate well to the virtual world.

Another consideration is the sequencing of attacks. Should cyber power be held in reserve for the turning points in battle, or can it be best used as the preliminary strike? Or should it be applied as a constant unrelenting barrage throughout an engagement?

Some answers are known already. For example, the classic “3:1” ratio of forces needed for offense to defense, developed as a gauge for ground combat, is clearly not applicable in the cyberspace domain. But other warfighting principles and techniques, from the basic through the advanced, remain to be discovered. For example, what is the cyberspace equivalent of the “Immelmann” air maneuver that came out of World War I dogfighting, or the “Crazy Ivan” developed by Cold War submariners?

Defensive strategies must also be further developed. For example, when should fixed-point fortifications be relied on versus mobile defensive countermeasures? These and many other combat strategies cannot be relied on using a default solution based on the first idea presented or the program that is cheapest or quickest to implement. Instead, dedicated and concentrated effort must be applied to development of cyberspace strategies and techniques, as was done in other realms of conflict. Many modern battle techniques have emerged from Service War Colleges and Command and Staff schools.

While it is too early to determine the optimal strategic, operational, and tactical employment of cyberspace forces, we do not need to wait until after a major conflict to find the answers. Instead, a robust simulation, war game, and exercise program should be pursued as the primary line of effort. Sun Tzu’s ancient prescription to “know your enemy, know yourself, and in 100 battles you will not be defeated” must be adapted to the virtual test range. Even though a particular technique or formation may appear to be working, the alternatives must be considered until every feasible angle is investigated. While it is true that exercises, simulations, and war games do have a role in today’s military, they are often seen as a drain on resources away from the day-to-day operational mission. This dynamic needs to be reversed for cyberspace to ensure the right investments for the future.

Conflict in the cyberspace domain does not benefit from the natural evolution mankind experienced in the physical domain. We are used to judging distance and speed by eye and can readily apply such lessons. Similarly, hundreds of years of experience in structural engineering yields, as a byproduct, the ability to calculate the destructive effects of explosives against facilities. In comparing the domains, even our most advanced cyberspace practitioners are still novices when it comes to fully understanding the terrain and methods of maneuver. The potential risks and rewards are too great to wait to learn these lessons the hard way—in the course of battle. Therefore, while simulation, war games, and exercises are part of every military mission, they must play an even more extensive role for cyber conflict.

Instead of selecting a particular strategy now and pursuing it straight away, a sizable portion of the cyber force should be devoted to developing the path ahead. For much of the Cold War, a majority of military forces focused on getting ready for a battle they fortunately never fought. A return to this type of model may be prudent for cyber forces, filling the calendar with a variety of realistic exercises and virtual force-on-force simulations. Strategic Air Command was the pinnacle of this approach, being well-known (one could say almost “infamous”) for its rigorous exercise, training, and evaluation program to support readiness. The procedures for nuclear conflict had been finely honed, but painstaking practice was needed to ensure precise execution of the plan if called upon. The current state of cyber conflict requires a similar level of intense effort, far beyond the current level of commitment to exercises and training.

Cyber teams should be developed along different conceptual approaches and tested against each other—again, and again, and again. It may seem counterintuitive to take troops “off the line” when cyber incidents are occurring on a daily basis, but the long-term risk must be balanced against that of the present day. When the time comes to execute a major cyber conflict, we can ill afford to be surprised by major developments.

Conclusion

While the United States currently enjoys military superiority across the globe, developing the right strategy for cyberspace operations can mean the difference between victory and defeat in future conflicts. In the early 1600s, a tiny nation rose to pre-eminence in global affairs. The Dutch Gilded Age saw a transformation of the Netherlands from a minor possession of the decaying Holy Roman Empire into the world’s foremost maritime and economic power. The Dutch East India Company was at the heart of the “Dutch Miracle”—it was the world’s first multinational corporation financed by the first modern stock exchange. The story is relevant today because it is essentially a tale of new technologies and new organizational concepts being combined in a game-changing strategy, altering the global balance of power. Such stories are inspiring to some, but are potentially foreboding for the United States today.

The 21st century is no longer a time for business as usual when considering the shifting balance of power in cyberspace. Today, the United States, Russia, and China dominate, but tomorrow it could be smaller but highly advanced technical powers such as Israel, Japan, and Singapore that take the fore. Alternatively, the very essence of national power may be redefined as super-empowered individuals and international non-state actors such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Anonymous, and Google seize the initiative in a rapidly evolving landscape…as the Dutch did 400 years ago.

Without a crystal ball, it is impossible to know what the right strategy is. But we do know that the wrong strategy can lead to disaster. It is necessary to adapt to the changing situation readily apparent across the spectrum of day-to-day affairs. Today’s environment requires a non-linear extrapolation. The best swordsmen of their day, with the most training and finest steel, could not stem the tide of firearms and explosives. Now is not the time to just keep sharpening the sword. But it is also not the time to throw down the sword and take up an entirely new type of arsenal. Instead, a risk-management approach to balance the right ends, ways, and means of strategy demands spreading efforts across the range of potential outcomes to guard against both likely and unforeseen contingencies.
 

Rather than waiting for the aftermath of a major cyber conflict to show the way, a robust simulation and exercise program must explore a range of alternatives. This will require some sacrifice of readiness to execute current missions, but it is an investment in the future to avoid outcomes with the potential for much greater harm. The answers cannot be constrained to existing paradigms, so an important part of the future investment is to establish an organization free of ties to legacy structures and policies. DoD and U.S. Cyber Command should lead the charge in calling for a new organization to be their vital partner in developing the optimal cyberspace strategy for the nation. While U.S. Cyber Command focuses on its military role, another non-DoD element will be able to transcend the military, intelligence, law enforcement, and regulatory functions. Even while the Cyber Mission Force is still being fleshed out, it is time to raise the flag of the “United States Cyber Guard.”

David and Goliath

The story of David and Goliath is well known as a classic example of the improbable victory of an underdog over a more powerful foe. The author Malcom Gladwell, whose works focus on unexpected implications of social science research, recently published a book which concludes that giants are sometimes not as powerful as they seem, and history is replete with examples of unexpected outcomes of this nature

Gladwell suggested the hidden weakness of “Goliath” enterprises is their tendency to assume that the strategy that made them great will keep them great. The Goliath story shows that someone perceived as an underdog may actually have an advantage by employing an alternate strategy.

Favoring the underdog is a part of American tradition, but when it comes to cyber conflict, the United States is the “Goliath” of the tale. The February 2015 National Security Strategy states, “We possess a military whose might, technology, and geostrategic reach is unrivaled in human history.” From our 21st century telecommunications infrastructure and $13 trillion economy to our $600 billion DoD budget (which represents more than one-third of the entire global market), and seemingly omnipresent Intelligence Community, the United States rests atop a perch as the world’s sole superpower. But many are actively seeking to change the status quo, and a range of potential new foes is on the horizon. Developing the right strategy for cyber conflict is crucial because the United States cannot continue to rely on its size and strength to defeat future “cyber-Davids.”


About the Author

Mr. Abraham is a Distinguished Graduate of the National War College, a Principal Attorney with The CyberLaw Group, and member of the MCPA's Board of Advisors. He previously served as a Senior Executive in U.S. Cyber Command, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. He wrote this paper based on research sponsored by the Institute for Defense Analyses.

Photo credits (in order of appearance):  AFCEA International, onthenetgang.com, Huffington Post, Littlegate Publishing, Duffel Blog, Eder Flag, Department of Defense, GameSpy, RC Airplane World, Cryptome, silist.com.

The Cyber Security Ratio

posted Mar 30, 2017, 2:42 AM by Michael Lenart   [ updated Apr 20, 2017, 5:15 PM ]

By Daniel Cahill

 

Introduction

 

Governments and private firms spend significant amounts of their budgets on cyber security to ensure confidentiality, integrity, availability of data, and to limit liability. How much is enough? How do private firms compare to each other and how do they compare to governments and government agencies? These questions are difficult to answer because there are neither baselines nor standards. Current accounting practices and analysis consider cyber security expenses as a percentage of overall expenses. This method, however, misses the mark for two reasons. First, there is no standardization for cyber security requirements and therefore no baseline from which comparisons can be made. Second, it does not consider the value of the transactions and assets exposed to cyber threats. The Cyber Security Ratio allows for a fairer comparison across sectors by assigning a value to what is being protected and then comparing that value to what is being spent on cyber security.


Background


The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) utilizes multiple computer networks to conduct its daily operations; the two primary networks are SIPRNET and NIPRNET. Both SIPRNET and NIPRNET utilize the worldwide web (internet) to exchange information, the difference being that NIPRNET can actually send information and receive information/data from the Internet whereas the SIPRNET merely utilizes the NIPRNET/Internet as a means to securely tunnel encrypted information. No information/data originating from the Internet enters or leaves the SIPRNET network or vice versa. Furthermore, SIPRNET terminals are only connected to the SIPRNET, so there is no other method for data to move onto or off the system. In theory SIPRNET is inherently secure, with all of its contents being encrypted.1,2

 

The SIPRNET concept eliminates a vast majority of problems associated with network security as no unencrypted data is ever exposed to the Internet and the terminals themselves are fully shielded from the Internet. There is very little risk of data being compromised or malicious code being introduced directly from the Internet. The only real risk, aside from an insider threat, is denial of service. The additional, minimal expense with SIPRNET involves encrypting data at the point where data leaves the local network and decrypting data where data enters the network.

 

The NIPRNET is more like a typical business network and exposed to the same risks.  The cost of securing this network should be similar to that of any other network. In fact, an argument could be made that a typical firm is required to store and transmit all of its data in a manner that exposes it to the internet, whereas the Department of Defense has the option to transmit and store much of its sensitive data on SIPRNET.

 

Virtually every firm engaged in business utilizes the Internet in some way, shape, form, or manner, and very few firms utilize the “encrypted tunneling” technique in the way that DoD does. That is, very few firms use terminals that cannot send or receive data from the Internet. Considering this, how do these firms secure their data and networks? In government terms, a vast majority of these private firms utilize commercial off the shelf (COTS) solutions.



In order to determine the proper amount to spend on cyber security, the most important question is: How “sensitive” is the data being secured? The second question to ask is what is the threat? The answer to the first question is the foundation (or denominator) for the Cyber Security Ratio (alternately referred to as the Cahill Ratio/Number). There are five methods that can be used to accomplish this, all of which involve 1) assigning a dollar value to what is being secured, and 2) equating a dollar value to determine sensitivity. Once the value of what is being secured is determined, it can be compared to the expense of protecting it, which is the annual cyber security budget (the numerator of the cyber security ratio).

The Cyber Security Ratio can therefore be calculated as follows:

(Annual Cyber Security Budget/Annual Value of Assets and or Transactions Exposed to the Internet) x 10,000

 

These methodologies will be demonstrated and discussed below in the “Examples” section using data reported in financial disclosures from some well-known financial firms and the U.S. government.


The answer to the second question, “What is the cyber threat?”, is that all entities, government and private, face very similar threats and therefore no correction factor has to be applied to account for difference in risk. Most insurance policies/underwriting have an exception for war, meaning it is possible to insure a civilian airliner but not military aircraft. However, in the realm of cyber warfare there is no distinction between civilian and military. All entities are targets, including state/government functions and private enterprise.

 

Examples

 

The first method for calculating the Cyber Security Ratio (CSR) equates the value or sensitivity of the data to the annual expenses of the firm.

 

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)

Budget for 2015: 560 Billion USD3                                 ($560,000,000,000)

Cyber Security Budget for 2015:  4.7 Billion USD4         ($4,700,000,000)

CSR = 4,700,000,000/560,000,000,000 x 10,000   =     83.93

 

JP Morgan Chase (JPM) 2014-2015

Expenses for 2014:  61 Billion USD5                              ($61,000,000,000)

Cyber Security Budget for 2015:  250 Mil USD6             ($250,000,000)

CSR = 250,000,000/61,000,000,000 x 10,000         =    40.98

 

Bank of America (BAC) 2014-2015

Expenses for 2014:  75 Billion USD7                              ($75,117,000,000)

Cyber Security Budget for 2015:  400 Mil USD8             ($400,000,000)

CSR = 400,000,000/75,117,000,000 x 10,000         =    53.25

 


  

 

The above calculations demonstrate that spending on cyber security as compared to expenses varies significantly between the two financial services firms. Bank of America's CSR exceeded JP Morgan Chase's by 29.93%. This difference is significant because if one assumes other expenses are relatively similar, then the difference in cyber security expenses has a significant impact on net income. In the case of Bank of America, whose net income was $8.3 billion in 2014, this cyber security expense was 5% of its net income.

 

When we compare cyber security spending in the financial services sector to the U.S. Department of Defense, we see that DoD’s spending on cyber security as compared to expenses is 104.79% greater than JP Morgan Chase’s and 57.61% more than Bank of America’s. These numbers are well outside the realm of differences seen within the financial services industry and suggest DoD is over spending on cyber security – at least from the perspective of overall expenses.

 

A challenge of this method is that expenses may not accurately represent the value of the data that is being protected, particularly for firms who manage a large amount of assets. Using data from the aforementioned entities (and sources), we see that there is little correlation even within the financial services sector between expenses, assets managed (held), and shareholders’ equity (net assets). Bank of America’s expenses versus assets held is 50% greater than that of JP Morgan Chase. Bank of America’s expenses versus shareholders’ equity is still 20% more than that of JP Morgan Chase.

 

The second method is to measure the value of the firm in terms of either shareholders' equity or market capitalization. In the case of the Department of Defense, this would be the same as assets because for all intents and purposes DoD owns its assets outright. This only makes sense if you believe the total losses of a company are limited to shareholders’ equity and you disregard the loss of assets and/or liabilities.

 

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)

Total Assets for 2015: 2.3 Trillion USD9                      ($2,292,137,000,000)

Cyber Security Budget for 2015:  4.7 Billion USD10    ($4,700,000,000)

CSR = 4,700,000,000/2,292,137,000,000 x 10,000 = 20.50

 

JP Morgan Chase (JPM) 2014-2015

Shareholder’s Equity for 2014:  232 Bil USD11           ($232,065,000,000)

Cyber Security Budget for 2015:  250 Mil USD12        ($250,000,000)

CSR = 250,000,000/232,065,000,000 x 10,000      = 10.77

 

Bank of America (BAC) 2014-2015

Shareholder’s Equity for 2014:  243 Bil USD13           ($243,471,000,000)

Cyber Security Budget for 2015:  400 Mil USD14        ($400,000,000)

CSR = 400,000,000/243,471,000,000 x 10,000      = 16.43


 

 

 

Using the Shareholder’s Equity method we see that the Bank of America spends 52% more than JP Morgan. The Department of Defense spends 90% more than JP Morgan and 25% more than Bank of America. Again, we see that Bank of America is spending significantly more than JP Morgan and that DoD is spending significantly more than JP Morgan and marginally more than Bank of America.

 

Many, if not most, accountants consider the maximum loss as something similar/equivalent to shareholders’ equity. Any suggestion of considering the maximum loss as being total assets would be dismissed as unrealistic because you can’t take any more from a firm than shareholders’ equity (Shareholders’ Equity = Total Assets – Total Liabilities). This firm-centric perspective is dangerous because it dismisses the potential loss of assets held on behalf of the client. To put it simply, you can steal vastly more from a bank than the value of shareholders equity; this is a fact. And the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) does not cover losses that result from theft or fraud. The next method will take this possibility into consideration.

 

The third method is to consider the total assets of the firm, whereas the value of the data is the value of the total assets held by the firm. Using total assets makes sense if one believes the ultimate or most catastrophic loss is a loss of all of the firm’s assets rather than “net assets” or shareholders’ equity.

 

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)

Total Assets for 2015: 2.3 Trillion USD15                     ($2,292,137,000,000)

Cyber Security Budget for 2015: 4.7 Billion USD16      ($4,700,000,000)

CSR = 4,700,000,000/2,292,137,000,000 x 10,000 =  20.50

 

JP Morgan Chase (JPM) 2014-2015

Total Assets for 2014: 2.6 Trillion USD17                     ($2,570,000,000,000)

Cyber Security Budget for 2015: 250 Mil USD18              ($250,000,000)

CSR = 250,000,000/2,570,000,000,000 x 10,000 =    0.97

 

Bank of America (BAC) 2014-2015

Total Assets for 2014: 2.1 Trillion USD19                     ($2,100,000,000,000)

Cyber Security Budget for 2015: 400 Mil USD20          ($400,000,000)

CSR = 400,000,000/2,100,000,000,000 x 10,000 =    1.90

 

 

 

 

The aforementioned calculations demonstrate that even when considering total assets managed (or assets at risk), the results are highly disparate. Using this method, we see that Bank of American spends 95.81% more on cyber security than JP Morgan. When comparing Bank of America to DoD in this manner, we find that DoD spends a staggering 10 times or 976.51%  more on cyber security. When comparing DoD to JP Morgan Chase in this manner, DoD is spending a similarly staggering number of 20 times or 2,007.90% more. I believe this calculation most accurately represents the true picture of what is being spent on cyber security and also highlights the most excessive disparities between the Department of Defense’s spending and the spending of financial services firms. Again, the threats encountered by both are the same and both have similar assets to lose, yet some are spending drastically more than others.

 

The fourth way to measure value of the data is to measure the actual value of the transactions that take place across the network. An argument can certainly be made that this is what’s truly at risk for a firm above and beyond any other number presented above (at least from a cyber security perspective). Certain sectors, such as the financial services sector, deal with transactions that far exceed their expenses or even the value of their companies. An excellent example of this is the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), which executed transactions in excess of 11 trillion dollars in 2015.21 Yet, the parent company Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) had expenses of approximately 1.6 billion dollars, assets totaling 50 billion, and shareholders’ equity of 12 billion.22 This fourth manner is the one that presents the most challenges, as most firms do not publicly report the actual value of transactions that take place across their networks. Furthermore, estimates based on required disclosures would be difficult because many values are reported as “net values,” which negates the ability to estimate the value of actual transactions. All of this makes it extremely difficult to ascertain the CSR using this methodology. Additionally, the value of transactions does not necessarily represent the number of transactions taking place, which would be important because every time a transaction crosses the Internet, there is a risk of compromise. 

 

The fifth method would involve a combination of the first four methods. Perhaps a starting point would be sum of assets, value of transactions, and market capitalization/shareholders equity.

 

Challenges

 

Challenge #1: The most fundamental challenge with utilizing the CSR is a lack of data as most firms (and the government) are not willing to report all aspects of their cyber security spending. Most firms are afraid of the consequences of being deemed irresponsible regarding budget allocation for cyber security. Similarly, the federal government has funding mechanisms designed to obfuscate true spending. 

 

Challenge #2: Assigning a value that truly represents what is being protected. What is the price or cost of losing a client’s personal data/identity data? What if the client’s available credit is $100,000 versus $5,000? What is the firm’s reputation worth?

 

Challenge #3: How much spending is enough? If 50% more in spending only provides 5% more security, is that spending worth it? Related to the challenge of assigning a value is how can risk be measured if what is being protected does not have an objective, accurate, designated value?

 

Challenge #4: How much cyber security related information is the U.S. Department of Defense sharing with the private sector? Is it being shared equally? How much is the private sector benefiting from this sharing and what would the dollar value be to this support? A corollary of this is if U.S. firms operating in the EU are exposed in Europe, does that mean that the U.S. Department of Defense will share DoD derived information from their program with non-U.S. entities? Will the U.S. fund worldwide cyber security efforts by sharing the information derived from its cyber security programs? Where would the U.S. draw line in sharing cyber threat information?

 

Challenge #5: As discussed above – what is the threat, because without knowing the threat, it is difficult to assess risk. The threat faced by firms is the same threat faced by government and militaries, therefore an accurate assessment of the absolute threat is necessary to determine what cyber security measures must be taken. Basically, if it is determined that U.S. Department of Defense networks face threat “x,” then all networks worldwide would face the same threat.

 

Conclusions

 

Use of the CSR to compare financial services firms has identified significant differences across the sector. What does this mean? Most managers ask the following two questions: What does is cost? How much will it save? (Or how much income will it generate?) In the case of cyber security, the answers to those questions are apparently ambiguous. Rating agencies and actuaries have had a difficult time assessing risks and threats, particularly as they apply to cyber threats and financial services firms in general. Also, as discussed above, underwriters are not in the business of underwriting risks associated with war and cyber threats are a result of warfare – cyber warfare. Therefore, at this point, the proper amount to spend on cyber security are the best estimates of those directly involved/invested. As cyber security risks become underwritten, standards will be developed and enforced by insurers and/or government regulators/regulations; in the meantime, these expenditures appear to be rather arbitrary. The above notwithstanding, it does appear that either the U.S. Department of Defense is spending too much on cyber security or financial services firms are spending too little. It is also quite possible that Bank of America is spending too much on cyber security and JP Morgan Chase is spending too little. Regardless, it is difficult to conclude that each of the entities considered above is spending the proper amount on cyber security.

 

Perhaps most importantly regarding the Department of Defense, it has always been difficult to assign a value to national security. The U.S. Department of Defense is not only securing itself, but is securing the entire nation. That said, as we’ve identified above, there are many firms, like the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), that are securing vastly more than their own value (net assets and/or shareholders equity). I would venture to say that in a similar manner, the value of the daily transactions across the network of financial services firms are much greater than the value of their assets. So perhaps the argument that the Department of Defense is securing the entire nation is moot OR there is a dollar value to assign to the support being provided to firms by the U.S. Department of Defense. If the latter is true, then dollar value for the support provided by DoD can then be added to what firms are spending and/or subtracted from the cyber security spending by foreign entities (and perhaps domestic as well) not protected by the U.S. Department of Defense.

 

Furthermore, unlike financial services firms, the Department of Defense has the SIRPNET to secure much of its sensitive information. I would offer that the cost of maintaining this SIPRNET is vastly less than the difference between what DoD is spending on cyber security versus financial services firms. Considering this assumption, what would be the value of the remaining information left on the NIPRNET? Perhaps the best way for DoD to secure its NIPRNET is with COTS technology that would be more in line with what financial firms are utilizing. 

 

Epilogue

 

Both firms and governments need a balanced approach to cyber security spending to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data, and to limit liability. The most efficient approach to spending is usually spending in a manner that provides the most absolute gain. As discussed in challenge number 3, if 50% more in spending only provides a 5% increase in security, is that spending worth it? If our adversaries (or other firms) are obtaining a 90% solutions by spending half as much, how should that affect our spending? From a national security perspective, if our adversaries are removing their “sensitive” networks from the internet, essentially precluding a data compromise, does that negate the need for traditional cyber security for those networks? What would be the true cost of total compromise of the DoD’s NIPRNET? Is DoD placing too much sensitive data on the NIPRNET and not enough on the SIPRNET? Again, hopefully the CSR will assist firms, government policymakers, and underwriters in developing the most appropriate courses of action.

 

 


About the Author

Daniel Adams Cahill is a Commander in the Navy Reserve, where he supports the Naval Inspector General. He holds a Bachelor's Degree in Marine Engineering, with a concentration in Nuclear Engineering, from the United States Merchant Marine Academy. He earned graduate certificates in International Relations and in Business from Columbia University, where he focused on applying business principles to military strategy and foreign policy.


 

End Notes


1. “Secret IP Data”. Defense Information Services Agency. http://www.disa.mil/Network-Services/Data/Secret-IP.  Accessed 24 Mar 2017.


2. “Using the SIPRNET”. Defense Human Resources Activity. U.S. Department of Defense.  http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/osg/s1class/siprnet.htm. Accessed 12 Mar 17.


3. “ UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST”. Comptroller – U.S. Department of Defense. http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/FY2016_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. Accessed 12 Mar 17.


4. Sternstein, Aliya. “The Military’s Cybersecurity Budget in 4 Charts”. Defense One. http://www.defenseone.com/management/2015/03/militarys-cybersecurity-budget-4-charts/107679/. Accessed 12 Mar 17.


5. “JPMORGAN CHASE & CO (Filer) CIK: 0000019617” (JP Morgan 10-K. 2015). JP Morgan Chase & Co. http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/viewer?action=view&cik=19617&accession_number=0000019617-15-000272&xbrl_type=v#. Accessed 12 Mar 17.


6. Glazer, Emily. “J.P. Morgan CEO: Cybersecurity Spending to Double”. Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/j-p-morgans-dimon-to-speak-at-financial-conference-1412944976. Accessed 12 Mar 17.


7.  BANK OF AMERICA CORP /DE/ (Filer) CIK: 0000070858” (Bank of America 10-K, 2015). http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/viewer?action=view&cik=70858&accession_number=0000070858-15-000008&xbrl_type=v#. Viewed 12 Mar 17.


8. O’Daniel, Adam. “Moynihan: BofA's cyber security given unlimited budget 'to keep us safe'”. Charlotte Business Journal.  http://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/blog/bank_notes/2015/01/moynihan-bofas-cyber-security-given-unlimited.html.  View 12 Mar 17.


9. “AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2015”.  U.S. Department of Defense. http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/afr/fy2015/3-Financial_Section.pdf.  Viewed 12 Mar 17.


10. Sternstein, Aliya. “The Military’s Cybersecurity Budget in 4 Charts”. Defense One. http://www.defenseone.com/management/2015/03/militarys-cybersecurity-budget-4-charts/107679/. Accessed 12 Mar 17.


11.  JPMORGAN CHASE & CO (Filer) CIK: 0000019617” (JP Morgan 10-K. 2015). JP Morgan Chase & Co. http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/viewer?action=view&cik=19617&accession_number=0000019617-15-000272&xbrl_type=v#. Accessed 12 Mar 17.


12. http://www.wsj.com/articles/j-p-morgans-dimon-to-speak-at-financial-conference-1412944976


13. “BANK OF AMERICA CORP /DE/ (Filer) CIK: 0000070858” (Bank of America 10-K, 2015). http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/viewer?action=view&cik=70858&accession_number=0000070858-15-000008&xbrl_type=v#. Viewed 12 Mar 17.


14. O’Daniel, Adam. “Moynihan: BofA's cyber security given unlimited budget 'to keep us safe'”. Charlotte Business Journal.  http://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/blog/bank_notes/2015/01/moynihan-bofas-cyber-security-given-unlimited.html.  View 12 Mar 17.


15. “AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2015”.  U.S. Department of Defense. http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/afr/fy2015/3-Financial_Section.pdf.  Viewed 12 Mar 17.


16. Sternstein, Aliya. “The Military’s Cybersecurity Budget in 4 Charts”. Defense One. http://www.defenseone.com/management/2015/03/militarys-cybersecurity-budget-4-charts/107679/. Accessed 12 Mar 17.


17. “JPMORGAN CHASE & CO (Filer) CIK: 0000019617” (JP Morgan 10-K. 2015). JP Morgan Chase & Co. http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/viewer?action=view&cik=19617&accession_number=0000019617-15-000272&xbrl_type=v#. Accessed 12 Mar 17.


18. Glazer, Emily. “J.P. Morgan CEO: Cybersecurity Spending to Double”. Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/j-p-morgans-dimon-to-speak-at-financial-conference-1412944976. Accessed 12 Mar 17.


19. “BANK OF AMERICA CORP /DE/ (Filer) CIK: 0000070858” (Bank of America 10-K, 2015). http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/viewer?action=view&cik=70858&accession_number=0000070858-15-000008&xbrl_type=v#. Viewed 12 Mar 17.


20. O’Daniel, Adam. “Moynihan: BofA's cyber security given unlimited budget 'to keep us safe'”. Charlotte Business Journal.  http://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/blog/bank_notes/2015/01/moynihan-bofas-cyber-security-given-unlimited.html.  View 12 Mar 17.


21. “ Daily NYSE Group Volume in NYSE Listed, 2017”.  The New York Stock Exchange. http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_edition.asp?mode=table&key=3141&category=3.  Viewed 12 Mar 17


22.  Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. (Filer) CIK: 0001571949” (NYSE Parent Company 10-K).  Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/viewer?action=view&cik=1571949&accession_number=0001571949-15-000003&xbrl_type=v#.  Viewed 12 Mar 17.


Photo credit: globalknowledge.com



Cyber Leader Development Program: Developing Tomorrow’s “Cyber-Savvy” Officer Today

posted Feb 19, 2017, 3:14 PM by Clara   [ updated Feb 21, 2017, 12:46 PM by Michael Lenart ]

By Jason M. Bender

The establishment of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) in late 2010 highlighted the necessity of understanding cyberspace as an operational domain and how to integrate it with traditional warfighting. Two of the most candid articles in the past six years – both published in 2015 – cite an article Small Wars Journal published for me in 2013, an article that voiced frustration by offensive cyber operations planners regarding a disconnect between the cyber and operational communities.1 In their articles, Martha VanDriel and Natalie Vanatta further emphasize that operations in the physical domains are heavily reliant on cyberspace and can be easily disrupted by ignorance of cyberspace operations basics. Further, operational staffs at all levels still need professional military education and self-study to better understand effects that can be brought to bear in the physical domains from cyberspace.2

A number of recent articles emphasize the need to develop expert and capable cyber operators – officer and non-commissioned officer alike – and discuss the necessity of where, which, and how much training is needed to do this. A recent article in Army magazine posits that many of the officers transferring into the cyber community from the operations branches do not understand cyber or possess any sort of operational background that might help the cyber community. The article further comments that “[g]iven the carryover from their legacy branches and the necessarily strong emphasis on technical versus tactical expertise, the vast majority of junior cyber officers are not prepared to assume such a role” without substantial preparatory professional education. This thus presents a transitional dilemma to both the branch and the community as these officers pass through education and training required to get them to the point of technical and operational proficiency.3

After publishing my original article I left the cyber operations community to be the Professor of Military Science at the University of Cincinnati, refocusing my professional efforts to recruit, develop, and commission Army Second Lieutenants. It did not take long to realize that, where the military services struggle to develop cyber understanding in their existing enlisted and commissioned ranks, an opportunity exists to develop some of that understanding at the pre-commissioning programs (i.e., service academies and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs). Rather than aiming solely to create officers whose formal branch is Cyber, the Army can more generally create cyber-capable, or “cyber-savvy,” officers who accede into a variety of branches. This realization led me to reach out to friends at the Army Cyber Institute (ACI) located at the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) to inquire about their creation of a Cyber Leader Development Program (CLDP).4

USMA’s CLDP design provides “800-plus hours of cyber-related education, development, and experience outside of the traditional classroom environment.”5 In other words, USMA’s CLDP goes above and beyond the standard academic education that West Point cadets receive to further broaden and develop these future Army officers, and this is done pre-commissioning. ACI’s CLDP provides USMA cadets with opportunities to participate in cyber-related internships, to attend cybersecurity-related symposiums and conferences, and mandates participation in a regularly meeting “student club” equivalent that reinforces skills and concepts learned and promotes curiosity and enthusiasm for things cyber. On top of all of this, each USMA CLDP cadet is the recipient of targeted mentoring by USMA faculty and ACI personnel. At accessions (i.e., branch assignment), USMA CLDP participants are considered for Cyber, Military Intelligence (MI), and Signal branches if that is what the cadet wishes. Just as many choose Infantry, Armor, or Aviation irrespective of their major. The point, however, is that regardless of what the USMA CLDP cadet branches at commissioning, they are generally “cyber savvy” and will likely remain that way for the remainder of their military career, whether that includes remaining in their branch, transferring to the Cyber branch at some point, or separating from the service.

USMA’s CLDP is matched by U.S. Army Cadet Command (USACC) at only a handful of senior ROTC programs. At best, a small handful of ROTC cadets are accepted annually to national cyber-related internships managed by USACC every summer, or they might participate in university sponsored co-operative internships if their major program incorporates it.6 Mentorship while on campus is at best hit-or-miss, and based entirely on whether ROTC detachment cadre have relevant experience in the cyber operations community. Given the mismatch of opportunities between USMA and ROTC, it makes sense to implement CLDP at those universities with robust cyber-related majors and better develop and prepare ROTC cadets to integrate cyberspace operations into the operational environment they will experience after graduation. Whether those ROTC cadets choose to branch Cyber, MI, or Signal, or are branched Infantry or Military Police, they will have a better understanding of cyber-related concepts than their non-CLDP counterparts who take nothing beyond their university core or major requirements. Despite recognition by a handful of senior ROTC program Professors of Military Science (PMS) who implemented CLDP at their respective universities, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command has yet to adopt basic cyber education in the Basic Officer Leader Course – A (BOLC-A) curriculum. Additionally, USACC has not implemented CLDP more widely, despite the obvious benefits to the Army in creating cyber savvy officers.7


Challenges faced with building cyber ‘savvy’ leaders

Army leadership struggled with the decision to create a new Cyber branch. However, after four years of fighting among the Army’s signal, intelligence, and operations communities, the Secretary of the Army established Cyber as a basic branch (Operations Career Field 17) on August 21, 2015. The branch was headquartered at Fort Gordon, Georgia at the U.S. Army Cyber Center of Excellence, where the Cyber School resided alongside the Signal School.

Despite the step forward in creating the Cyber branch, the Army continues to struggle with identifying and assigning personnel capable of operating under two masters – the cyber and operational communities. What’s more, this problem is compounded by cyber and maneuver personnel’s mutual lack of understanding of each other’s areas.8

At the most basic level, Army branches are designed to fulfill the needs of the Army from the point of accession to the point of separation and provide a steady stream of educated, experienced, and developed branch-specific specialists. These branch specialists are assigned at the tactical to strategic levels, to the operational to institutional parts of the Army, and even to enterprise, joint, interagency, and multi-national settings to bring their expertise to bear for the benefit of others. Yet it remains difficult to “[grow] competent, confident, self-aware leaders who are prepared for the challenges of the future in combined arms joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM) operations.”9 Doing this requires an awareness and understanding of cyber operations and effects – which the basic branches rarely provide, as they remain focused on addressing branch-specific competencies.

Personnel assignments at both ARCYBER and USCYBERCOM continue to be top-heavy (i.e., senior company grade, field grade, and warrant officers, and senior non-commissioned officers). This forces recognition of a branch structure that represents a diamond standing upright on its tip rather than a pyramid like most Army basic branches. Where some argue that the existing branch structure and manning meets the Army’s readiness needs, this argument is contingent on the pyramidal basic branch structure where far fewer lieutenant colonels are needed than majors, far fewer majors are needed than captains, and fewer captains are needed than lieutenants. Attrition as officers progress up the basic branch pyramid is a result of self-selection, non-selection for promotion, or deliberate administrative separation.10 Some of this attrition will result in basic branch officers transferring to the cyber branch, but as already mentioned, some of them simply do not have the education or bona fides to qualify for selection.

Beginning its growth, the Cyber Branch accessed thirty cadets – fifteen each from USMA and ROTC – over the past three accessions cycles (Fiscal Years 2015 – FY 2017). Unlike infantry, armor or field artillery second lieutenants who face less than six months of Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC-B) training before reporting to their first operational unit, the new cyber second lieutenants face a pipeline of training that in some cases stretches out to two years before they are considered qualified to perform their duties at their first assignment.11 Even with that, they will still not be the subject matter experts in offensive or defensive cyber operations at the operational levels for many years. This unavoidable delay in providing cyber expertise to the overall force underscores the need to improve the basic cyber savviness of non-cyber officers.

As mentioned previously, the Army Cyber Branch’s current structure makes it so that more captains and majors are needed than lieutenants. Given the minimal accessions as compared to the basic maneuver branches, it will be some time before Cyber Branch is fully capable of meeting the Army’s needs at the upper tactical and operational levels. It may be up to five years or longer before the Army reaches a minimum number of fully capable personnel (i.e., trained and experienced) who can effectively apply cyber capabilities to support field commanders’ needs, intent, and guidance. This, more than anything else, emphasizes the need for traditional maneuver and operational support basic branch officers to educate themselves on cyber basics and, once identified through assessment or self-identification, transfer the best candidates into the Cyber Branch at the captain and major ranks. It also speaks of a need for standardized professional military education at the basic branch schools and the Command and General Staff College to build a general understanding of cyber operations across the force, but especially in the operations career fields.12

As important as this is, however, something even more beneficial can be done.

 

Building a ROTC CLDP 

Army ROTC has produced nearly seventy percent of the Total Army’s second lieutenants over the past 100 years.13 With only half of the Cyber branch accessions over the last three fiscal years, though, ROTC is proportionally underrepresented. This indicates that USMA cadets have benefited from CLDP in a way that ROTC cadets – having no such program – have not.

Having learned of CLDP, a fellow PMS and I travelled to USMA to visit ACI in early 2015 to determine the best way to replicate CLDP at our respective university ROTC programs.14 Working with peers from ACI and the U.S. Army Cyber School, we collaborated and designed an ROTC CLDP concept easily reproduced at any ROTC program at which there are ROTC cadets pursuing cyber-related majors, related academic minors, or who have purely personal interest.15 Following USMA’s CLDP requirements, we recommended the following requirements for Army ROTC CLDP:

• Major or minor in a cyber-related discipline (e.g., computer science, information technology, computer or electrical engineering, systems engineering with focus on cybersecurity), or mathematical sciences (with a focus on cryptography and discrete math);

• Cyber-related internship of at least three weeks (e.g., at the Department of Defense, Army, intelligence community, private or public sector organization, or national laboratory);

• Participation in an extra-curricular cyber club or study group for two cumulative academic years (e.g., Association for Computing Machinery’s Special Interest Group for Security, Audit and Control (SIGSAC); Cadet Cyber Competitive Team);

• Attendance at a cybersecurity training opportunity or conference; and

• Participation in an ACI-approved cybersecurity capstone project or competitive event.16

We also recommended that USACC add a CLDP coordinator – an officer from Cyber Branch Proponent – in a similar fashion to the ROTC brigade nurse coordinators, and we identified opportunities for the Simultaneous Membership Program (SMP) employed by ROTC with the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard. SMP cadets are paired with U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard (ARNG) units and are assigned a military occupational specialty as they pursue their commission through ROTC. The intent behind this is to leverage the professional military education and training opportunities in nearby MI, Signal, and Cyber units.17

 

Concept to Reality – University of Cincinnati Army ROTC CLDP

Putting all of this into play, University of Cincinnati (UC) Army ROTC instituted CLDP in the spring of 2015 with eight cadets pursuing cyber-related majors and minors. Partners in this effort included UC’s Department of Electrical Engineering and Computing Systems (College of Engineering and Applied Science (CEAS)); School of Information Technology (College of Education, Criminal Justice and Health Sciences (CECH)); School of Information Systems (College of Business; Department of Operations, Business Analytics and Information Systems); and Department of Political Science (College of Arts and Sciences). As it was, the National Security Agency (NSA) designated UC’s Department of Electrical Engineering and Computing Sciences in late-2014 as a Center for Academic Excellence (CAE) – Cyber Operations, and the School of Information Technology secured the NSA designation as CAE – Cyber Defense Education in the first half of 2016.18 Where only fourteen schools nation-wide hold both NSA designations as CAEs for Cyber Operations and Cyber Defense Education, University of Cincinnati remains the only university in the nation to hold both NSA CAEs and have a resident ROTC CLDP.

In implementing CLDP at UC, the immediate focus was to secure cyber-related internships for CLDP participants. Fortunately, the computing sciences (CS), electrical engineering (EE), and information technology (IT) tracks in UC’s CEAS and CECH benefit from integrated, experienced-based learning and career education programs (i.e., ‘co-operative’ internships), something that UC itself pioneered more than 100 years ago.19 In working to secure internships for the non-CS, -EE, or -IT CLDP participants, we relied at first on USACC centralized summer Cadet Professional Development and Training (CPDT) internship opportunities. In doing this, we quickly realized that rising third-year cadets were at a disadvantage in competing against the rising fourth-year cadets who attend Advanced Camp and then participate in follow-on training or internships at Army units and joint headquarters throughout the world. This led to developing relationships with the Ohio ARNG in spring 2015 and securing the first unpaid internship for a rising third-year CLDP cadet with the Columbus, Ohio-based Cyber Protection Team during the summer of 2015. In 2016, three rising fourth-year CLDP cadets were selected for the NSA’s ROTC Cyber Internship Program, while a number of others participated in co-operative internships organized by UC’s EE/CS, IS, and IT departments.

As the relationship between UC Army ROTC and the Ohio ARNG Cyber Protection Team matured, the opportunity presented itself to place three cadets with the Cyber Protection Team in an SMP status – a first in the nation. The Ohio ARNG Cyber Protection Team commander and state J-6 interviewed and vetted all three cadets before approving transfer from their existing Ohio ARNG units to the Cyber Protection Team. This relationship additionally led to professional training opportunities for two of the SMP cadets in the summer of 2016, and opened the door for stand-by selection of both cadets, along with a third CLDP cadet, to attend the U.S. Air Force Institute of Technology’s Advanced Cyber Education later the same summer. In addition to the “hands-on” experience the internships provide, UC CDLP cadets are also encouraged to pursue part-time employment (time permitting) with local IT or cyber-related companies. One non-scholarship CLDP cadet took a part-time job with the IT department at Kroger’s world headquarters in Cincinnati.

Collaborating with the ACI, all CLDP participants are added to a national distribution list overseen by ACI and ROTC CLDP mentors. Mentors routinely send out emails that highlight training opportunities or recent articles of interest. Cadets routinely ask questions of and seek advice from the mentors. ACI additionally sends out a monthly newsletter-type document that highlights recent activities in the cyber operations community, promulgates cybersecurity tips and tidbits, and promotes discussion between CLDP participants. ACI additionally facilitates quarterly video teleconferences hosted by the USMA Cyber Research Center’s SIGSAC, in which CLDP programs are able to connect, listen, watch, and participate in the discussion.20 Lastly, to satisfy the club participation requirement, UC CLDP cadets are encouraged to participate in UC’s Cyber Crime Cats student club, or to join a local chapter of the Association of Computing Machinery, National Cybersecurity Student Association, or the Military Cyber Professionals Association.21

As for the capstone project, all of UC’s colleges that host cyber-related majors and minors have fourth-year capstone classes that focus on synthesis of the student’s academic pursuits and serve as the culminating demonstration and validating event. UC’s Department of Political Science also partners with the School of IT and hosts a 5000-level Cyberattack Red Team Collaborative Seminar that crosses traditional computer science, IS/IT, and policy lines for a truly multidisciplinary approach to cybersecurity. The seminar culminates with student-teams developing and testing strategies for attack and defense scenarios in a “force-on-force” capstone to identify weaknesses and validate multidisciplinary theories. In addition to the university capstone options, other alternatives include local and national cyber defense exercises regularly advertised by ARCYBER, ACI, and NSA as part of the CLDP mentorship program, or through other local cyber-related organizations.

CLDP at UC Army ROTC today includes several cadets with non-cyber related majors or minors and is integrating UC Air Force ROTC cadets to grow the program further. These non-cyber and non-Army cadets, participating out of personal interest, are embarking down their individual path to cyber savviness. Growing to fifteen members in the fall of 2016, UC’s first four CLDP participants will graduate and commission in the spring of 2017. Of those four, one will branch active duty Infantry, two will branch active duty Signal Corps (with branch details to Field Artillery), and one is expected to branch Cyber with the Ohio ARNG. With the growth of UC Army ROTC’s CLDP to fifteen members during fall semester 2016, it is now the second largest CLDP in the nation behind USMA – modest for sure, but aggressively forging ahead in spite of the challenges faced.

 

Challenges to ROTC CLDP Sustainability

As much as was done at UC, CLDP faces two major sustainability challenges at the university ROTC detachment level. First and foremost is the issue of mentorship for the CLDP cadets by ROTC detachment cadre. Where USMA is able to provide each CDLP cadet with a specific mentor – some mentors cover two or three USMA CLDP cadets – the ROTC detachment cadre cannot in most cases mentor CLDP cadets unless the cadre member has cyber experience in their background- most of whom don’t.

In those ROTC detachments that do have a cyber savvy cadre member – most times one officer – that officer will mentor five or ten, or possibly fifteen CLDP cadets in addition to his or her normal mentorship responsibilities as a Military Science and Leadership instructor for an entire year-group cohort of cadets. In the case where the mentor happens to be the PMS – whose purview includes the entire cadet battalion – the mentor-mentee ratio becomes even more lopsided. Further complicating this is that it is highly unlikely that Cyber Branch officers will be assigned as Assistant PMS or PMS in the foreseeable future due to the nascent nature of the branch and its modest size.

Reassignment of ROTC cadre who provide CLDP mentorship further complicates things, when those reassignments are unanticipated and come as a result of promotion, selection for professional schooling, or retirement. In many cases, the only requirement for selection for assignment to an ROTC detachment, other than university requirements on advanced education or specific military occupational skill designations, is combat experience. In ROTC detachments where no mentorship exists due to a total lack of cadre cyber experience, CLDP is unlikely to flourish. Similarly, ROTC cadre with experience in cyber operations who successfully stand up a CLDP program at their university may see it crumble after reassignment when their replacement has no cyber experience, education, or understanding.

The second challenge is funding – USACC provides no funding whatsoever for CLDP and securing funding falls in the lap of the ROTC detachment PMS or Assistant PMS serving as the CLDP mentor. At schools with large, well-developed ROTC alumni programs and funds, funding is far less of an issue than at those schools lacking well-developed alumni programs, or where foundational or alumni fund income is nothing more than a trickle. UC Army ROTC finds itself in this latter category, and finding alternative sources of income becomes tricky due to the amount of time needed to network and investigate funding sources. In light of this, continuing to develop and maintain relationships with the colleges and the university IT sections becomes a critical path to gaining equipment needed to facilitate CLDP club activities.

While visiting the UC CLDP in spring 2016, the U.S. Army Cyber School Commandant commented on the Cyber School’s inability to promote and support ROTC CLDP programs, and he recommended that CLDP cadets and mentors adhere to a ‘grass roots’ mentality in seeking and securing funding and equipment from the local communities. While this encourages an innovative and creative mindset, ROTC cadets are first and foremost pursuing a university degree in order to commission. Requirements to self-fund or self-build a CLDP program, on top of all of the cadet’s other ROTC and academic and professional development requirements can get to the point of overwhelming cadets in similar fashion as those cadets who overextend themselves with Ranger Challenge, Pershing Rifles, cadet battalion leadership and administration, or other extracurricular activities (e.g., fraternities/sororities, student government, club sports).

 

Concluding Thoughts 

The original intent of USMA CLDP was to be a pilot program that ultimately expanded to ROTC.22 In only a handful of cases did this happen, and then only when championed by an ROTC detachment cadre member with knowledge of CLDP and awareness of resources and requirements at the university level. After the ACI visit in the spring of 2015, we wrote an information paper detailing how to implement CLDP at university ROTC detachments and recommended how to make it sustainable. USACC convened a planning session at Fort Knox, Kentucky in late September 2015 to assess the concept, and a team composed of members of USACC G3, ACI, NSA, and UC Army ROTC made the same recommendations to the commanding general. That concept was later assigned to USACC’s 6th ROTC Brigade for further development, but as of the time of this article’s publication nothing else appears to have come of the effort.

It is worth commenting, as a final aside, that while every Army ROTC cadet is required to take an American military history course, no such requirement exists for them to take any sort of computer science course or cyber policy-related course (e.g., political science) – if they are even offered at the university.23 If we are truly trying to create “cyber savvy” leaders, priming them in the pre-commissioning phase is optimal. What better place to incorporate cyber operations awareness and basic understanding than thru the BOLC-A pre-commissioning ROTC curriculum to ensure one hundred percent “touch and coverage” for all ROTC cadets? If nothing else, it is a step in the right direction in creating “cyber savvy” officers.

If CLDP is implemented, supported, and sustained in a more formal manner than just “grass-roots,” realizing the “cyber savvy” leader as a product of Army ROTC at the point of commissioning is a realistic goal. Unless ROTC cadre with the necessary cyber experience are assigned, and funding is provided by the university or USACC, CLDP at ROTC detachments will quickly become unsustainable. Here too, an opportunity exists for both Cyber Branch and USACC to institute a top-down mentor program at Cadet Command, or its subordinate brigades, similar to the already existing Nurse Counselor program where Army Nurses are assigned at the ROTC Brigades to mentor and track the progress of ROTC nursing cadets at the university levels.24 While opportunities exist, if CLDP is not formally supported and sustained, it will remain nothing more than an abstract concept or temporary local innovation.

Finally, where Cyber Branch seeks to create “competent professionals who… earn the trust of leaders from other operational branches,” the Army, and specifically USACC, need to focus on pre-commissioning requirements as the best place to create cyber-capable officers. Creating CLDP at ROTC detachments with robust cyber-related academic programs is the first step and is a “win-win” situation. Implementing CLDP needs to be quickly followed with adoption and integration of basic cyber education into all levels of the ROTC BOLC-A pre-commissioning curriculum and Cadet Summer Training, as USMA is already beginning to do.25 Given that the predominance of second lieutenant production over the past century belongs to USACC, this puts USACC and  ROTC detachments in a unique position to greatly affect the foundational cyber knowledge of future generations of officers – especially those who branch other than Cyber – and thus influence the Army’s long-term institutional knowledge and intellectual culture for decades.

 

 

About the author: Lieutenant Colonel Jason M. Bender is the Head of the Department of Military Science and Professor of Military Science for the Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) detachment at the University of Cincinnati. A Regular Army field artillery officer, Lt. Col. Bender served at all levels from tactical to strategic, and most recently served with U.S. Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER)/2nd Army as ARCYBER’s first Chief of Fires and U.S. Cyber Command J35 Offensive Cyber Operations Planner; and later as an ARCYBER/2nd Army G5 Strategy and Policy Planner. He holds a bachelor’s degree in mathematics from Oregon State University; master’s degrees from Troy University and the U.S. Army School of Advance Military Studies; and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He is also a recipient of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association's Order of Saint Isidore and the U.S. Field Artillery Association’s Honorable Order of Saint Barbara.

 

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed here are expressly those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of any organization of the U.S. Department of Defense or University of Cincinnati.

 

 

End Notes

1. Jason Bender, “The Cyberspace Operations Planner,” Small Wars Journal, 05 November 2013, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-cyberspace-operations-planner. Coincidentally, I didn’t discover until drafting this article how many times my original article was cited since Small Wars Journal published it almost three years ago. The realization that others see value in what you’ve said and consider it worth repeating is humbling.

2. Martha S.H. VanDriel (Colonel, USA), “Bridging the Planning Gap: Incorporating Cyberspace into Operational Planning,” 04 May 2015,

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Bridging-the-planning-gap/2015/05/04; and Natalie Vanatta (Major, USA), “A Year of Cyber Professional Development,” 23 January 2015, http://www.cyberdefensereview.org/2015/01/23/professional-development/.

3. Justin Considine (Lt. Col., U.S. Army) and Blake Rhoades (Capt., U.S. Army), “How to Grow a Capable Cyber Officer,” Army, January 2017: 19-21; see also Scott R. Gourley, “Closing the Capabilities Gap: Seven Things the Army Needs for a Winning Future,” Army, February 2017: 36-41.

4. ACI facilitated the implementation of CLDP with the intent of providing cadets “who are interested in cyber security studies… [an opportunity to] enhance their education with a wide range of broadening opportunities… as well as mentorship to guide them in their development within the field of cyber security.” United States Military Academy, “Memorandum for Record: Cyber Leader Development Program in the Army Cyber Center, USMA.” West Point, NY: USMA. 09 October 2013.

5. Ibid.

6. USACC’s centralized, annual summer internships normally include opportunities at USCYBERCOM, National Security Agency (NSA), U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, and the Army’s 1st Information Operations Command and opportunities to attend the U.S. Air Force Institute of Technology’s (AFIT) Advanced Cyber Education (ACE).

7. Army pre-commissioning leader development programs (i.e., USMA and senior ROTC) are designated by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command as BOLC-A. See U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Regulation 35-36 Basic Officer Leader Training Policies and Administration, Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 01 September 2015; http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/regs/TR350-36.pdf.

8. Considine and Rhoades, “How to Grow a Capable Cyber Officer”; and Bender, “The Cyberspace Operations Planner”.

9. Department of the Army, DA Pamphlet 600-3 Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 01 February 2010: 2; http://www.apd.army.mil/Search/ePubsSearch/ePubsSearchForm.aspx?x=PAM.

10. Candice Frost (Lieutenant Colonel, USA), “Ignorance and Arrogance: Misunderstanding the Officer Personnel Management System,” Military Review (Spotlight Article), 05 January 2015;

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/repository/spotlight/Frost-Jan-2015.pdf.

11. Cyber BOLC-B is thirty-seven weeks long, nearly twice the longest comparable basic branch BOLC-B. Length of follow-on post-BOLC training is dependent on the cyber officer’s first assignments (i.e., National Mission Forces, tactical unit Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) Element, etc.). Laura Levering, “Army Cyber School marks major milestone,” Army.mil, 17 August 2015;

https://www.army.mil/article/154001/Army_Cyber_School_marks_major_milestone.

12. See DA Pamphlet 600-3, Part II, which includes branch descriptions and requirements for Infantry, Armor, Aviation, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Engineers, Military Police, Special Operations, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs branches and the Information Operations functional area.

13. C. Todd Lopez, “ROTC has minted over 1,000,000 new lieutenants during its 100 year history,” 05 June 2016;

https://www.army.mil/article/169167/ROTC_has_minted_over_1_000_000_new_lieutenants_during_its_100_year_history/.

14. USACC oversees 275 Army Senior ROTC programs at more than 1100 universities and colleges across the United States and its territories, the majority of which have some type of cyber-related academic major or minor. “Army Reserve Officer Training Corps,” STAND-TO!, 02 December 2015; https://www.army.mil/standto/archive_2015-12-02.

15. Lt. Col. James Scrogin, PMS at Purdue University Army ROTC; ACI’s Lt. Col. David Raymond and Lt. Col. (then-Major) James Finocchario; and Lt. Col Robert Johnson, Assistant Commandant at the U.S. Army Cyber School.

16. Jason Bender, James Scrogin, David Raymond, Robert Johnson, Tim Groves, and James Finocchario, “INFORMATION PAPER: Establishing a Cyber Leader Development Program (CLDP) in United States Army Cadet Command (USACC) Senior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (SROTC) Programs”, 05 May 2015.

17. Bender, et. al., “INFO PAPER: Establishing CLDP at USACC SROTC Programs”; see also Department of the Army, Army Regulation 145-1 Senior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps Program: Organization, Administration, and Training,” Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 22 July 1996: Chapter 3; Department of the Army, Army Regulation Regular Army and Reserve Components

Enlistment Program, Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 31 August 2016: Chapter 6; and Department of the Army, National Guard Regulation 600-100 Commissioned Officers: Federal Recognition and Related Personnel Actions, Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 15 April 1994: Chapter 13.

18. See “National Center of Academic Excellence in Cyber Operations: Mission and Purpose,” http://ceas.uc.edu/cyberops/mission.html; and “UC Becomes Leader in Cybersecurity Education,” http://cech.uc.edu/headlines/2016/it-nsa-cae-designation.html.

19. “Experienced-Based Learning & Career Education,” https://www.uc.edu/careereducation.html. See also Mary Niehaus, “University of Cincinnati Co-op: 100 years of success,” December 2005, http://magazine.uc.edu/issues/1205/success1.html; and Troy Onink, “College Co-Op Pioneer is Still Leading the Charge after 100 Years,” Forbes, 27 February 2012;

http://www.forbes.com/sites/troyonink/2012/02/27/college-co-op-pioneer-is-still-leading-the-charge-after-100-years/#29db89de5230.

20. See “SIGSAC – ‘Special Interest Group for Security, Audit and Control’”,

http://www.usma.edu/crc/sitepages/sigsac.aspx. Sponsored by USMA’s Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, SIGSAC is an academic club focused on developing leadership applicable to the cyber domain through knowledge sharing and cultivation of technical skill sets.

21. See Cyber Crime Cats, https://www.facebook.com/groups/cybercrimecats/ and

https://twitter.com/cybercrimecats; Association for Computing Machinery, https://www.acm.org/; National Cybersecurity Student Association, http://www.cyberstudents.org/; and The Military Cyber Professionals Association, https://www.milcyber.org/.

22. USMA, “Memo: CLDP in the Army Cyber Center”.

23. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Regulation 350-13 Instruction in Military History, Fort Eustis, VA; TRADOC, 05 March 2010: 14; see also U.S. Army Cadet Command (USACC), Cadet Command Regulation 145-3 Army Senior Reserve Officers’ Corps (SROTC) Basic Officer Leader Course – A (BOLC-A) – On-campus Training and Leader Development, Fort Knox, KY: USACC, 20 September 2011: 7. If the university or college does not have an American military history course, the ROTC detachment cadre is required to teach it to the cadets every semester themselves.

24. Bender, et. al., “INFO PAPER: Establishing CLDP at USACC SROTC Programs”.

25. Considine and Rhoades, “How to Grow a Capable Cyber Officer.” See also Matt Hutchison, Erick Waage, and Brent Chapman, “We Took West Point Cadets to (Cyber) War,” War on the Rocks, 21 June 2016; https://warontherocks.com/2016/06/we-took-west-point-cadets-to-cyber-war/


Photo credits (in order of appearance):  

U.S. Army ROTC

UC.edu

U.S. Army / Chuck Burden

U.S. Army / Bill Roche

Securing the Autonomous Revolution

posted Jan 25, 2017, 4:54 AM by Michael Lenart   [ updated Jan 25, 2017, 5:25 AM ]

By Paul L. Jordan

A self-driving car travelling through a two-lane tunnel has lost control of its brakes due to a mechanical failure. In the lane ahead, a road construction crew is making repairs. The software that drives the car faces a choice: continue straight ahead, almost certainly killing the construction workers, or change lanes causing a head-on collision and almost certainly killing the two drivers of the vehicles involved in the accident. This is an adaptation of the classic ethical thought experiment: the trolley problem [1]. This problem presents several ethical concerns with regard to autonomous vehicles, but how does cybersecurity affect this landscape? The answer? Nobody cares. 


As our military cyber community is acutely aware, neither industry nor society will slow down for security. In this case, industry is showing us that it is incapable of even slowing down for tough ethical dilemmas or drastic economic consequences, but for arguably good reasons. According to the CDC, in 2014, approximately 35 thousand people died in motor vehicle accidents in the United States.1 Further, according to a 2015 report from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 94% of automobile accidents were caused by human error.2 In a May 2015 report, Google announced that it had logged over 1.8 million miles driven by their autonomous cars with only two minor incidents, both of which were caused by other vehicles with human drivers.3 Incidentally, if all automobiles were automated overnight, roughly 33 thousand lives could be saved each year!



Unfortunately, this progress has potentially massive economic impacts. According to a 2016 report by the Bureau of Labor and Statistics, transportation makes up roughly 5% of our labor force.4  Furthermore, the second and third order affects aren’t insignificant. According to the American Truckers Association, there are approximately 3.5 million truck drivers employed in the United States.5 Automating transportation won’t only affect those jobs, but also all of the hotels, restaurants, and convenience centers that these truckers use every day. Should these impacts slow down the potential benefits of automating vehicles? They don’t seem to be. 


And there are serious cybersecurity concerns about automating transportation as well. In 2015, researchers were able to take control of a Jeep Cherokee through the internet.6 Just recently, a group of Chinese researchers were able to remotely control the brakes of a Tesla Model S.7 Hacks like this could have life-threatening consequences if not handled properly. But should these consequences slow the progression of technology that stands to save tens of thousands of lives each year? Fortunately, in recent years, it seems the sentiment is changing. Security is being talked about on major news outlets, and security is being considered in system design processes instead of after deployment. However, this is just a first step in the right direction. 


Autonomous travel is no longer a technical problem. Companies like Google and Tesla are racing toward an autonomous consumer vehicle, and a few commercial vehicles already exist. In recent years, it has become clear that computers will make better drivers than humans, and an enormous amount of money stands to be made by the company that does it first. As a result, there exist ethical and financial imperatives to automate transportation. To that end, many of the concerns that exist are being ignored. But the cybersecurity community cannot allow this to prevent us from working toward a secure autonomous vehicle. We all know the narrative: brand new shiny toy is introduced that makes everyone’s life easier; that shiny toy comes with security concerns; our recommendation is to hold off on implementing the new toy until we can secure it; our concerns are heard, but ignored; we throw our hands in the air and give up. That cannot be allowed to happen this time- especially in the realm of military hardware.


Now more than ever, we need to stay engaged in this effort. We must develop and innovate ways of securing this nascent autonomous revolution. Advances in automating military weapon systems are being pursued and made every day. Our role in securing those systems is more important than ever. We’re already seeing our military become increasingly dependent upon remotely piloted aircraft. Today, these systems are remotely piloted by humans and have limited autonomous capability, and they’re already the target of cyber-attack. From an operational perspective, these systems would ideally behave with complete autonomy. Unfortunately, this change would make them an even more valuable target for cyber-attack. Without the proper protection, these systems could be used against us.


But does this mean that complete autonomy should not be pursued? Again, the answer is that it does not matter. This technology will continue to be pursued because the end result is savings and efficiency in a period of time during which our senior leaders are looking for any such opportunity. 


Some critics of autonomy argue that some tasks are just too complex for computers to handle.  They argue that a computer could never identify a target and deploy ordinance to neutralize that target because that task is too complex. (Before the industrial revolution, factory workers probably shared this same sentiment about many of the tasks they performed.) But at the cutting edge, some of the artificial neural networks are performing far better than expected.8 For instance, accurately identifying objects in images is rapidly becoming a trivial task for intelligent systems. Why couldn’t these same systems be used to identify and target known combatants? Eventually, these systems will be able to target and neutralize threats much better than we can today while reducing unnecessary or unintended casualties. As such, we have a moral obligation to pursue them and arguably more importantly, secure them.


Ultimately, given the importance and relative similarity of artificial intelligence (AI) to the cybersecurity profession, we must ensure we understand the technical capabilities and limitations of AI so that we can contribute in a meaningful way to discussions on it. People are looking to us to be experts in these types of systems, and more specifically, the security of these systems. Let’s focus on getting this right so we can be known as the community that was part of the solution, instead of the community that let Skynet happen because we thought it never would.



About the Author

Paul Jordan is the founder of the St. Louis chapter of the Military Cyber Professionals Association(MCPA), and the current chief of MCPA Chapter Operations.  He holds an MS in Computer Science from the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) and currently works as a cyberspace operations officer for the Air Force.








References

[1] J. Thomson, “Double effect, triple effect and the trolley problem: Squaring the circle in looping cases,” Yale Law Journal, vol. 94, no. 6, pp. 1395–1415, 1985.

End Notes


1. http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus15.pdf

2. https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812115

3. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2094029-report-0515.html

4. http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat18.htm

5. http://www.alltrucking.com/faq/truck-drivers-in-the-usa/

6. https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/

7. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/20/tesla-model-s-chinese-hack-remote-control-brakes

8. http://karpathy.github.io/2015/05/21/rnn-effectiveness/


Photo credits (in order of appearance): Google, dronewars.net



Winning the Public to Private Transition

posted Jan 22, 2017, 6:11 AM by Michael Lenart   [ updated Jan 23, 2017, 12:20 PM ]

By Adam Tyra, Contributing Editor

Many government and military cybersecurity professionals have felt the pull of the private sector in recent years. According to industry observers at Cybersecurity Ventures, the shortfall of available cybersecurity professionals compared to the number of available cybersecurity jobs worldwide is expected to reach 1.5 million by 2019.1 The cybersecurity labor market, as with other markets, responds to the law of supply and demand. This means professionals can expect strong salaries and low unemployment for the foreseeable future. Cybersecurity professionals working in the public space have never been faced with a greater variety of opportunities than they have right now, and many of this magazine’s readers are undoubtedly considering a career change in the near future.

 

While the opportunities are undeniable, your readiness to capitalize on them might not be. The military has been described as a “culture within a culture” in the ways that it simultaneously mirrors and diverges significantly from American civilian life. This will never be more apparent to you than while you’re searching for your first position after the military. While I have insights to share from my own experience making the transition and building my career, I have another set of experiences that I’d like to share- interviewing and evaluating candidates just like you. In the past three years, I have conducted in-person interviews for well over 100 cybersecurity professionals, mostly veterans, and I have also conducted resume reviews and phone screens for more than 500 additional professionals. I gained this experience while helping build the team at the world’s second largest cybersecurity consulting firm. This article will discuss a few of the things that I learned and hopefully prepare a few readers for success when they decide to make their own transition.

 


Get Noticed

 

Unless you are referred by an acquaintance or get spotted at a career fair, your first contact with a potential employer will likely occur online after submitting your resume. Gone are the days of snail mailing your resume on high quality paper directly to a hiring manager. Instead, you’ll need to attract a computer’s attention first. Indeed, a human will probably never see your resume unless it contains one or more keywords associated with an open position. Potential search terms include certification names, security tool names, skills such as “reverse engineering”, and previous job titles. If it was in the job description, it needs to be in your resume.

 

Once you get to the human review phase, brevity is key. You want all killer and no filler. Plan on one page per four years of experience and no more than two pages total. Why? How many eight-year-old technologies / skills are still relevant to you in your current job? If you think two pages isn’t enough space, carefully read what you wrote. Is it all killer with no filler? No? Slim it down. Reading other people’s resumes is neither interesting nor a treasure hunt. If a recruiter needs more than ten seconds to decide whether someone is worth a phone conversation, then the answer is probably no.  

 

So, what should you put in your two-page resume to make it all killer? First and foremost, you need to make it about the employer and not about you. There is only one reason to hire anyone ever a belief that the person in question will help solve a problem. If you’re wondering what problems businesses need solved, just read the descriptions for the jobs that they have available. Most job seekers have heard that they should tailor their resume to the job they want, but service members have a terrible track record actioning this advice. For example, here are a few things that you should not include in your civilian resume: combat experience, training courses dealing with combat skills, words like “terrorism”, “war”, “deployment”, a listing of military awards earned (more on this in a moment), a listing of the dollar values of property owned in various roles, and military jargon of any type.

 

Keep in mind that, statistically speaking, the person reading your resume almost certainly has never served in the military. They will have great difficulty making the mental leap between “person who was successful in battle” and “person who will get the job done for me.” In some cases, you might even intimidate the person and you will definitely cause doubts about your cultural fit and maybe even your mental stability (really). Awards present a similar challenge. Your resume doesn’t include any information about what you did to get them, so a hiring manager doesn’t know how to value them.

 

Instead of using up valuable real estate talking about the counterinsurgency school you attended, list the college courses you took where you learned programming and network engineering. Don’t say that you’re an expert on “WIN-T”, say that you’re an expert on satellite communications. Instead of discussing “DIACAP”, explain that you have experience with cybersecurity compliance and governance. If you aren’t sure how to describe your skills, get help, because resume writing is a no-fail portion of the job hunt.

 

You need to civilianize job titles. This is easier said than done, though, because commonly used job titles mean different things in different companies. A director might be a senior leader in one place and a first line supervisor at another. Regardless of the exact titles you select as equivalents to your military job, you should convey progression, a steady increase in responsibilities over time, and rough equivalence. Here are a few examples. Mix them with functional areas as necessary (e.g. malware analysis shift supervisor, etc.).

·         Security Analyst. You routinely put your hands on the keyboard and work with tools to get your job done. You might be a penetration tester or conduct security monitoring. 0-2 years of experience.

·         Team Lead / Shift Supervisor. You have several analysts working for you to perform a specific function like incident response. Most of your day still consists of analyst work. 2-5 years of experience.

·         Manager. The individuals who report to you have people who report to them as well. You’re involved with interviewing and hiring entry-level personnel. Managing consumes the majority of your workday, and your opportunities to use your technical skills are declining. 5-8 years of experience.

·         Director. You’re responsible for an entire department, facility, or a sizable team. You are responsible for a budget that you spend according to an approved plan. You’re involved with interviewing and hiring supervisors and managers. Management consumes your entire workday, and you only deploy your technical skills to conceptualize solutions. 8-12 years of experience.

·         Executive. Your decisions affect the entire organization, and you have the ability to set strategic direction for large parts of the enterprise. You have a budget that you spend on your own authority. You may hire and fire employees on your own authority. You make procurement decisions on your own authority. You rarely do anything now that your entry-level or junior management self would have recognized as work. Overseeing and approving the work of others now consumes your entire workday.

 

Be careful not to appropriate prestigious titles as equivalents unless you’re sure that they’re a good fit. I have seen multiple resumes of senior O3 and junior O4 officers who identified themselves as the “CISO” of their unit. Unless you were involved in hiring and firing employees, settings strategy, conducting procurement, budgeting, etc., you were not the equivalent of a C-level anything. This type of title inflation sounds as absurd to a civilian hiring manager as your friend who is a help desk manager would sound to you if he told you he was, “basically equivalent to a General.”    

 


Get Hired

 

You’ve gotten an interview. Nice work. Remember that the labor market for cybersecurity skills is strong, and your skills are in demand. While the employer is learning about you, be sure you’re learning everything that you need to know about them as well. Think of job interviews like dates. You definitely don’t want to marry everyone that you date, so you need to quickly determine whether a position is worth pursuing to avoid wasting your time (and theirs). Here are a few other tidbits to help you make the right match.

 

Don’t be too agreeable. Playing the good Soldier by affirming your willingness to undergo any hardship is not the right play at this point. You need to get what you want, and not just be what the employer wants. In my current career, travel is a significant requirement. We typically inform candidates that they will be required to travel up to 80% of the time and verify that this won’t be a problem. For candidates that indicate that they can’t (or don’t want to) travel, the interview ends pretty much immediately. This is better for both sides. Remember, the company has to fit your culture just as you have to fit theirs. Talking your way into a position you’ll hate and eventually quit only means stress for you and significant disruption for the employer. So, if you think that something about the position isn’t right, say so and look elsewhere.  

 

Don’t talk about or around classified information. In fact, don’t mention or allude to it at all. I’ve interviewed multiple candidates who claimed that they were with the NSA, CIA, TAO, Delta, the Space Marines, etc. but couldn’t reveal any details about the work that would support my decision about them. If, at any point, you are forced to deflect a question about your background with the claim that, “It’s classified,” you will definitely irritate most interviewers. If you have relevant experiences that are sensitive, leverage your respective organization’s resume review process to make sure that you understand where the lines are. Then, figure out what you can say that’s both meaningful and acceptable. If you can’t do this, then don’t waste the space on your resume or the interviewer’s time.   

 

Be honest with the employer (and yourself) about the nature of your skills. Remember that your organization (unit, agency, etc.) wasn’t your role. Making coffee at CIA headquarters doesn’t make you a Clandestine Service member any more than making briefing slides at Cyber Command makes you an elite super hacker. Many service members lose sight of this, and some overestimate their own level of expertise because of it. I’ve seen former watch officers, shift supervisors, and staff members from various impressive-sounding organizations fail technical phone screens, because they equated talking the talk of cybersecurity with walking the walk. Think about the top three tools that you use in your daily work. Are they Word, PowerPoint, and Excel? If so, you probably aren’t suited for an engineering role. Similarly, if the list includes Ida Pro, gcc, and gdb, then you shouldn’t go after a sales manager position.


 

Get Paid

 

You’re getting a written offer. Congratulations! Compensation is one of the main reasons why cybersecurity professionals decide to make career changes, and it will probably be among your primary selection criteria when you evaluate opportunities. It’s true that there is usually a significant pay gap between what you’re currently getting as a government employee and what the civilian equivalent for your position can command in the job market. According to CIO magazine, the average salary earned by a cybersecurity worker in the United States in 2013 was $116,000.2 However, you need to calibrate your expectations before beginning your job search to ensure that you’re prepared to negotiate compensation effectively. The following are a few points you should consider.

 

You should have some idea what a job pays before applying. Research the average pay for a role before submitting your resume. My favorite source for this type of data is glassdoor.com. For large companies, you can find a wealth of information on the average salary and bonus structure for a range of positions offered by your employers of choice. You can also search by city to see, for example, what an average cybersecurity manager makes in Fresno, California if you’re evaluating an offer from a nearby company that isn’t well represented in glassdoor.

 

While you should expect a healthy bump in pay when you make the transition, don’t become overwhelmed by a feeling of entitlement. Remember that the single most important factor in salary determinations is time. More professional experience generally commands a higher salary, while other factors generally don’t. For example, if the role requires a bachelor’s degree, while you have a graduate degree, don’t expect this to automatically translate to a higher salary.

 

When comparing offers, mind the differences between jobs. Roles that pay significantly more than other similar opportunities usually require something unpleasant from you. This unpleasant thing could be relocation to an undesirable place (deployment, maybe?) or extensive travel in general. It could also include persistent required overtime. Requirements like these may or may not change your mind about whether these jobs are worthwhile opportunities. Even they still seem worthwhile, remember that this effect on quality-of-life should be a consideration in compensation negotiations. Be sure you also consider the cost of living where the job is located: $100k in San Antonio, Texas goes a lot further than $100k in San Francisco, California. Also remember the importance of advancement opportunities, and training and education support.

 


Continuing Your Service

 

As you transition into the private sector, an important parallel consideration is how you can continue your service in the government/military cybersecurity community on a part-time basis. While many uniformed personnel will transition to one of the reserve components to continue their military service, there are also other opportunities to stay involved through organizations such as the Military Cyber Professionals Association (MCPA). Each has its advantages and disadvantages. As a reservist you can continue to advance your skills through the rapidly expanding catalog of military cyber training courses. Military service also exposes you to situations and experiences that you’ll never find in the private sector, and you get a paycheck of course.

 

Understand that the days of “one weekend a month and two weeks in the summer” were left behind at the end of the 20th century, however. Much more will likely be expected of you as the military works to expand both its active and reserve cyber forces in the coming years. If you aren’t sure whether or not this is for you, try it out for a few months. Even if you eventually discover that the part-time military life doesn’t work for your situation, your reserve unit will serve as a type of transition support group while you adjust. At the very least, you’ll have a captive audience with whom to share your great war stories long after your significant other has grown tired of hearing them.

 

If continued military service isn’t for you, you can also expand your involvement in volunteer organizations like the MCPA. Volunteers willing to work are always in short supply for every non-profit organization, and the MCPA is no different. There are always leadership positions available from the local to the national level, including national officer roles. If you’ve always wanted to increase your involvement in the MCPA but didn’t have time, consider this both a reminder and a renewed invitation.  

 

Final Thoughts

 

While this article focused on the transition itself, I have a few comments on preparation for those who might be a few years out from a transition. First, make sure that you have the right credentials for the jobs you want. Specifically, get certified and get educated. Many talented cybersecurity professionals feel that certifications and diplomas are mere “pieces of paper” that don’t actually prove that a person has skills. Maybe. But they’re also table stakes for most jobs. Think of these credentials as though they’re a driver’s license. Even if you’re a phenomenal driver, you’ll still be required to possess a license in order to drive legally. Get this out of the way, while the government is willing to pay for it on your behalf.

 

Finally, network as much as you can. I have been continuously surprised and dismayed by service members’ disinterest in or downright unwillingness to network with their civilian counterparts. In this respect, college students who have no professional experience vastly outclass veterans when it comes to job hunting. You won’t be working for the government forever, and it pays to have friends to call on when you’re ready to move. You never know who will be able to refer you or vouch for you or who will be in a position to hire you outright. And, even if your friends don’t refer you, you could still find yourself in a position to refer them. Every company that I’ve worked for since leaving active duty paid referral bonuses, and some roles carried bonuses as high as $10k.

 

Cybersecurity professionals today couldn’t hope for better career prospects than they’ll see for at least the next decade. Finding a position somewhere is almost a foregone conclusion for most cyber defenders leaving government service, but maximizing your outcomes after a transition takes a bit of work. By sharpening your resume, maximizing your interview skills, and ensuring you’re prepared to negotiate compensation, you’ll ensure that you’re prepared to capitalize on your skills when you decide to make the move.





About the Author

Contributing Editor Adam Tyra is a cybersecurity professional with expertise in security operations, security software development, and mobile device security. He is currently employed as a cybersecurity consultant. Adam served in the U.S. Army and continues to serve part-time as an Army reservist. He is an active member of the Military Cyber Professionals Association and is a former president of the San Antonio, Texas chapter.








End Notes


1. http://cybersecurityventures.com/jobs/

2. http://www.cio.com/article/2383451/careers-staffing/cybersecurity-pros-in-high-demand--highly-paid-and-highly-selective.html


Photo credits (in order of appearance): military.com, LinkedIn, Investopedia, ClipartBro.com, Breaking Defense





An Interview on Cyber Norms

posted Jan 17, 2017, 4:27 PM by Michael Lenart   [ updated Jan 19, 2017, 4:28 AM ]


Robert Morgus is a policy analyst and Dan Ward a cybersecurity fellow for New America’s Cybersecurity Initiative. They’re also the authors of the informative (and entertaining) Professor Cy Burr’s Graphic Guide to International Cyber Norms. They agreed to sit down with Cyber Editor-in-Chief Michael Lenart to discuss their graphic guide as well as the major issues associated with developing international cyber norms.  


 

Q: As you do in the International Cyber Norms graphic guide, let’s start with the basics: What do we mean when we talk about “international cyber norms,” and how are they developed?

 

Dan: Norms are the informal, unofficial standards of behavior that guide the way people and nations interact. They get formed in several different ways – sometimes they emerge organically, other times they are developed strategically and deliberately. There’s a whole adoption process that we outline in the comic.

 

Robert: Dan is spot on. In this case, norm is short for normative behavior. In the most basic sense, a norm is a description of existing behavior. However, in the international cybersecurity context we’ve seen the emergence of two different types of norms: actual norms—which are a description of actual behavior—and aspirational norms—which describe ideal behavior.

 

 

Q: Along with norms, the graphic guide identifies coercion and treaties as the other means by which states can limit destructive behavior. What is the relationship among norms, coercion, and treaties – especially in a cyber context?

 

Dan: They all intersect and overlap a bit. For example, using treaties instead of coercion (or vice versa) can be a norm. The types of coercion or retaliation a country chooses to engage in are largely determined by norms.

 

 

Q: Did treaties and/or coercion contribute to the development of the Obama-Xi pact, i.e., China’s acceptance of a norm against industrial espionage? Or is there a better real-world example of the linkage among norms, treaties, and coercion?

 

Robert: Coercion and international law (treaties) most certainly played a role in the development of the Obama-Xi pact. People close to the indictments of five People’s Liberation Army hackers in the Western District of Pennsylvania would suggest to you that those indictments, a form of coercion, were more or less responsible for bringing Xi to the table. The legal side of this particular case study is complicated. There are international institutions like the World Trade Organization and various trade pacts (like the Trans-Pacific Partnership and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) that could provide the victim of economic espionage with a legal platform to seek some form of remuneration. However, there is no universal international law that directly addresses the issue of economic espionage.

 

 

Q: With regard to how one defines “cybersecurity,” you discuss major philosophical differences between two camps, roughly divided between western liberal democracies in one camp and Russia, China, and various other non-western states in the other. Can you describe these philosophical differences about cybersecurity and, broadly speaking, the political efforts each camp has undertaken to advance their particular perspective?

 

Robert: For the last decade, the diplomatic policy of much of the west has been to treat cybersecurity and information security as two separate issues. This means that when the US engages other camps on cybersecurity norms, the discourse has been limited to discussions on norms for engagement around attacks on physical infrastructure and what the US calls computer network operations. However, in other parts of the world, like Russia and China, cybersecurity and information security are deeply interwoven. Thus, a codification of national sovereignty over a given state’s cyberspace—which refers to information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure, but not the content on it—has been met with a call for national sovereignty over information space—a thinly veiled attempt to allow states to control the internet and communications content that flows over their ICT infrastructure. The U.S. and rest of the west have been hesitant to engage on these topics as part of their diplomatic strategy. However, given the attention paid to the alleged Russian information operation around the U.S. election, it may be time for the west to reconsider this staunch separation.

 

 

Q: In two of Robert’s recent articles, he refers to statements by NSA and Cyber Command Chief Admiral Mike Rogers about a "series of ongoing conversations" the U.S. is having with other states on developing cyber norms. What can you tell us about these conversations?

Robert: Admiral Rogers is right to point to ongoing conversations the U.S. is having with other states. We engage at the multilateral and bilateral level with the likes of our partners in Europe, as well as some nations that are seen as more adversarial in this space like Russia and China. However, in part due to disagreement over the content of these conversations, they have stalled. One of the forums that has been instrumental in illuminating areas of agreement has been the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) in the Disarmament Committee. However, at the end of last year’s meeting in August, the representative to the GGE from Russia is said to have stated that he thought all the agreement that could be reached on the topic has been, and some states have backtracked a bit on commitments made during past meetings.

 

 

Q: In the graphic guide, “Professor Cy Burr” briefly introduces Chris Painter, the State Department’s Coordinator for Cyber Issues and a major player in the U.S.’s work on cyber norms. Do you have any recommendations for how the Defense Department can improve its collaboration with State and/or other federal agencies to advance the development of international cyber norms?

 

Dan: Norms are generally informal and unofficial, which means cooperation is the key to getting a norm adopted. That’s why I think the various federal agencies have to make collaboration on this issue a priority. No single agency has complete jurisdiction over cyberspace, no agency has complete autonomy, and norms are almost never adopted just because one stakeholder wants it to be. Precisely because cyberspace is a shared domain, precisely because we all have interests and priorities and opinions about what norms should be adopted, it is crucial that we talk and collaborate, both at the senior leadership level and the lower levels.

 

 

Q: Since a norm is essentially an agreement among stakeholders who must share at least a basic level of trust, how large a role can norms play in the interactions of states like the U.S. and Russia (or China), whose relations often lack that basic element of trust?

Dan: Norms present us with an opportunity to develop a virtuous cycle (as opposed to a vicious cycle), because while norms require a certain amount of trust, they also help foster trust. So if we can get the ball rolling a little, with a few basic, easily-agreed upon norms, they can serve as building blocks to greater levels of trust and cooperation.

Robert: Dan is right, of course, but at the same time, breaching a norm can cause increased tension and further disintegration of trust. In the case of cybersecurity norms, this is a particularly realistic concern because, while many norms have been clearly articulated in writing, some are simply assumed and sometimes not necessarily assumed universally. This can lead to confusion should one state violate the perceived norm of another and also give potential norm defectors cover to plead ignorance.  

 

 

Q: Can you give an example or two of the type of basic, easily agreed upon norm that could get the ball rolling, like you mention above?

Dan: The best place to start is with norms already in place in other areas of international activity, such as the law of armed conflict (LoAC). Nation-states already have general agreements on things such as distinguishing between civilian and military targets, ensuring proportionality of response, and avoiding unnecessary suffering. So while we don’t have universal agreement that current international agreements and laws of war translate in full to cyberspace activities, there are certainly pieces and components of existing agreements we can use as these initial building blocks.

Robert: I’m not so sure there is a ton of low hanging fruit here, and I’ll break a bit from Dan in my answer. For the last decade, the U.S. has focused their strategy on negotiating or translating norms mostly from the armed conflict space, like LoAC. Over the last year I’ve become increasingly skeptical that this is the right approach to negotiating international cybersecurity norms. When I look at the vast majority of state cyber operations, I do not see military operations that should therefore be governed by the laws of armed conflict. Instead, I see intelligence operations that are far more akin to traditional espionage practices. From my perspective, it is important for those developing our norms strategy to understand and tease out what this means with regard to what sorts of existing norms we should be pushing for application in cybersecurity and where the key pressure points are for the development of new norms.

 

 

Q: This is admittedly a complex question that doesn’t lend itself to simple answers, but roughly speaking, how would you assess the international community’s current progress on developing and implementing a set of workable cyber norms?

Dan: As we explain in the comic, we’re very much in the early stages of this activity, largely because we are still in the early stages of learning to live in cyberspace. We’re still exploring. We are still figuring out what questions to ask and how to find answers, so it’ll be a while before we have a robust, shared set of cyber norms. The other thing to understand is that norms are not static. They tend to emerge and evolve over time, so I don’t think we should expect to ever have a set of norms as a complete, finished product. Norms are always a work in progress.

Robert: Absolutely. I would also say that we’re still in the exploratory phase wherein the international community wrestles with what should be the content for norms (recall the cybersecurity vs. information security debate). Recent events could push this stage to a culmination as western countries are pushed to acknowledge the relevance of information security.

 

On behalf of Cyber and the Military Cyber Professionals Association, I’d like to thank Mr. Morgus and Mr. Ward for taking time out of their busy schedules to share their valuable knowledge and insights with us. Integrating an understanding of cyber norms with traditional military cyber competencies can lead to a more thoughtful, strategic, and ultimately more beneficial application of cyber capabilities and capacities.

I strongly encourage all readers to review the graphic guide that prompted this interview.

-M. Lenart, Editor-in-Chief




Photo credit: TR Service Learning Academy

Trump on Cyber Warfare

posted Dec 28, 2016, 7:49 AM by Shawna Bay   [ updated Dec 29, 2016, 1:55 PM ]

by J. L. Billingsley 

Preface: This article is not a political endorsement nor piece of partisan propaganda. I nor the nonprofit I founded have received any form of support from any political or Trump related entity. This is an independently conceived evidence-based analysis intended to illuminate a specific topic currently muddled in opinionated bickering and misunderstanding, the likes of which complicate thoughtful policy analysis and planning. It is incumbent upon fellow members of the American national security community to hasten progress from a mudslinging campaign mindset to more mature rational discussions that will better poise our nation for success in the coming years.[i],[ii],[iii]


For a man who prides himself on being unpredictable, President-elect Donald J. Trump has been exceedingly clear that he will prioritize developing America’s cyber warfare capabilities during his administration.[iv] In various venues (including speeches, tweets, and publicized meetings), Trump has clearly indicated his intent to address our nation’s ability to both throw a punch and take a hit in cyberspace. Below is a review of some such indications.

His First Address

It has not gone unnoticed within national security circles that Trump chose to highlight the cyber threat in his first official public address as President-elect…


“On national security, I will ask the Department of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a comprehensive plan to protect America’s vital infrastructure from cyber-attacks, and all other form of attacks.”[v]

As anybody familiar with the inner workings of government bureaucracy and resource allocation (sometimes referred to as sausage-making) will attest, words matter. Further, the order of words by national leadership matters and has a direct impact on which programs receive funding (the means that enable all operations) and which ones do not. With this insight is mind, the above statement is truly telling.

While only briefly discussing national security among a short list of immediate priorities in the address, cyber is not only included but is leading. That is in stark contrast to how we typically hear cyber included in lists, after more established forms of military power (such as air and maritime capabilities).[vi] Including cyber in such lists has been sufficient to ensure a funding stream to steadily develop this capability. However, the prominence Trump bestows on cyber in this intentional and polished statement signals to us that cyber will be a true priority, both in funding and operationally.

National Security Speech

In October 2016, during a talk hosted by a veterans group, candidate Trump opened with a lengthy discussion about the importance of developing cyber capabilities. While I have included only a fraction of his relevant statements in this excerpt, they clearly support this article’s main conclusion and require no further elaboration.

“I’d like to address one of the most important aspects of America’s national security, and that’s cyber security. To truly make America safe, we must make cyber security a major priority... As president, improving cyber security will be an immediate and top priority for my administration... The scope of our cyber security problem is enormous. Our government, our businesses, our trade secrets and our citizens’ most sensitive information are all facing constant cyberattacks and reviews by the enemy… I will make certain that our military is the best in the world in both cyber offense and defense… I will also ask my secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs to present recommendations for strengthening and augmenting our Cyber Command. As a deterrent against attacks on our critical resources, the United States must possess — and has to — the unquestioned capacity to launch crippling cyber counter attacks. And I mean crippling, crippling. This is the warfare of the future. America’s dominance in this arena must be unquestioned… Cybersecurity is not only a question of developing defensive technologies but offensive technologies, as well... We should turn cyber warfare into one of our greatest weapons”[vii]

Tweet History

Some of his statements to the veterans group go into detail about the role and cost of various notable hacks on American targets. Those 2016 statements appear consistent with his cyber related concerns expressed years ago, sometimes conveyed in tweets. See some of these comments below…




[viii]

Social Media


From being used to topple governments during the Arab Spring to enabling Trump to directly engage millions of followers, social media platforms like Twitter are powerful tools, and the President-elect clearly knows it.[ix] Among numerous other statements on the topic, he shared his views succinctly in a recent 60 Minutes interview…

“I have such power in terms of numbers with Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, et cetera, I think it helped me win all of these races where they’re spending much more money than I spent… I think that social media has more power than the money they spent, and I think maybe to a certain extent, I proved that.”[x]

As Trump acknowledges, backed up by the statements of numerous commentators, his ability to wield the power of social media allowed him to effectively shape the information environment in support of his primary objective…being elected President. Other statements of his indicate he plans to retain this critical capability in support of achieving other goals.[xi] Given the high value of these social media services to Trump, and since they are cyberspace based, both military planners and computer security experts can conclude that the in-coming administration will likely pursue expenditure of significant resources on cyberspace related efforts.

Relationship Building

Time is one resource he has already begun to invest into strengthening existing and building new relationships with leaders that will help inform and enable his cyberspace related efforts. For example, as he promised to do on the campaign trail, Trump recently met with Bill Gates, top Silicon Valley executives, and the leader of U.S. Cyber Command.[xii],[xiii] Trump’s selection of General Mattis to lead the Defense Department is beneficial, as well, since the General understands the cyber threat. This was abundantly clear in my first interaction with the recently retired General as he was on the way to spend quality time at Stanford University (an essential Silicon Valley institution).[xiv]


Trump meeting with Silicon Valley leaders in December 2016. From left to right: Eric Trump, Brad Smith of Microsoft, Jeff Bezos of Amazon, Larry Page of Alphabet/Google, Sheryl Sandberg of Facebook, Mike Pence, Donald Trump, and Peter Thiel (founder of PayPal).[xv]

In addition to discussing immediate cybersecurity concerns with such leaders, the President-elect’s emphasis on increasing technology related jobs in America is likely to bolster our nation’s severely underperforming and unsustainable STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) talent development pipeline (which includes K-12 education).[xvi] Given the natural forces of supply and demand, the more Americans with STEM talent that can qualify for government security clearances, the more capability our nation will have to triumph in cyber warfare and in the economic activity that enables such operations.

The Threat from China and Russia

Due to the current prominence and importance of the topic, no discussion of Trump and cyber warfare today would be complete without briefly addressing his views on China and Russia. While his attitude towards Chinese cyber activities (and generally) are clear and consistent (exemplified by the aforementioned tweets), his stance on Russia deserves some demystifying.

One underdiscussed but reasonable interpretation is that he intends to follow geopolitical common sense in a multipolar world by neutralizing threatening alliances that counter his nation’s influence. He recognizes this situation, as indicated in comments such as…

“You can't have everybody hating you. The whole world hates us. And one of the things that I heard for years and years, never drive Russia and China together. And Obama has done that.”[xvii]


In this case, he may be seeking to divide the powerful China-Russia bloc by aggressively courting Russia. This can be accomplished, in part, by building on shared vital interests (like countering the threat of Islamic extremism) and resolving peripheral differences (such as approach towards ending the conflict in Syria and Iraq).[xviii],[xix]

As of the writing of this article in late December 2016, a current point of contention between America and Russia are the leaks of politically sensitive American data by (potentially Russian) hackers. Trump has already developed a consistent narrative that categorizes (what some may refer to as) foreign state-directed cyber-attacks as a direct result of disrespect towards President Obama.[xx] Trump has repeatedly stated that Putin will respect him, which in this case includes a stop to such cyber related activity. Taking advantage of opportunities to affect foreign state decision-making through the power of personal diplomacy and negotiation, as opposed to the expenditure of more American blood and treasure, appears consistent with Trump’s overall emphasis on the American economy (which includes more efficient use of American power).

Conclusion

Upon reviewing this discussion about our new national strategist, any reasonable person can conclude that his administration will prioritize developing our nation’s cyber related capabilities. With such development, and their cost and ethical advantages over traditional military capabilities, we may even witness cyberpower becoming the tool of choice in upcoming conflicts.[xxi],[xxii] 


This anticipated evolution to a cyber-first footing in the national security community will have many implications yet to be conceived. It is obviously beneficial to those in cyber related industries, as well as citizens frustrated with increasingly frequent, high-profile, and costly hacking incidents. Without prioritizing cyber and addressing the nation’s current state of vulnerability, as the incoming administration is expected to do, the actions of potential adversaries risk antagonizing a nation fully capable of traveling “an alternate path.”[xxiii] With that in mind, this is a positive direction for all peoples.


About the author

















Joe Billingsley is founder of the 501(c)(3) educational nonprofit Military Cyber Professionals Association (MCPA) and is pursuing a PhD in Information Sciences. He is an Iraq War veteran, served as a Strategist and Cyber Operations Officer in the U.S. Army, and is a graduate of programs at the Army War College, Naval War College, Military Intelligence School, and Army School of Information Technology. He holds an MS in Cyber Systems and Operations from the Naval Postgraduate School and a BA in History from the University of Connecticut. He serves as Advisor to the Cyber Security Forum Initiative, faculty at George Washington University, and Fellow of the Center for Network Innovation and Experimentation.











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